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INTRODUCTORY NOTE
The three following lectures form the third series delivered at the
University of Illinois on a foundation established in 1935 by Mrs.
George E. Frazer of Winnetka, Illinois, as a memorial to her father,
the late Edmund Janes James, President of the University from 1904
to 1920. Under the terms of the gift the lecturers are chosen by
a committee selected from the professors of political science and
economics.
The first series of lectures, published in 1938, included a "Bio-
graphical Note of President James," by Evarts B. Greene, Professor
of History at Columbia University (formerly Professor of History
and Dean of the College of Literature and Arts at the University of
Illinois), and lectures on: "The American State University: A
Problem in Political Science," by Herman G. James, President of
Ohio University; "Public Service and the University Graduate," by
Leonard D. White, Member of the United States Civil Service Com-
mission and Professor of Public Administration, University of Chi-
cago; and "The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Nation,"
by Robert E. Cushman, Professor of Government, Cornell University.
The second series, published in 1941, included lectures on: "The
Constitution in Transition," by Thomas Reed Powell, Professor of
Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School; "The Compromise Principle
in Politics," by T. V. Smith, Congressman-at-Large from Illinois and
Professor of Philosophy at the University of Chicago; and "Historical
Foundations for a Democratic China," by Dr. Hu Shih, Chinese
Ambassador to the United States.
The lectures in the third series have been given by men of distin-
guished scholarship and with considerable experience in government
and practical affairs, and associated in some way with President James.
It is hoped that these lectures will be of value in stimulating interest
in problems of government.
Clarence A. Berdahl
H. M. Gray
John M. Mathews
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POST-WAR PLANNING

POST-WAR PLANNING 1
By Charles E. Merriam
Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago
It is a special honor and a special privilege to give this lecture as a part
of the series dedicated to the memory of former President Edmund
J. James. When I first came to the University of Chicago, at the age of
24, in the very humble capacity of Docent, I found one of my staunch-
est and soundest friends in the person of Professor James. He was
an inspiring personality, an encouraging colleague, and a wise coun-
selor. On many occasions his kindly smile and judicious words helped
me over rough places where I seemed to be slipping. Coming as I did
to Chicago from Columbia, Berlin, and Paris, he still further broadened
my horizon and encouraged me in the interpretation of my experiences.
I had many friendly colleagues in these days to whom I am under
deep obligation: Thorstein Veblen, John Dewey, Wesley Mitchell,
Ernst Freund, and others, but nothing was more helpful to me than
the wise words of Professor James.
I deem it therefore a very special distinction to give this lecture
on Post-War Planning as a part of the Edmund J. James series. Of
course I am not sure that Professor James would approve everything
that I am about to say, but I am confident that my thought will be set
in the lines of political and economic development which Professor
James himself followed so long, so persistently, and so successfully.
Speaking now in a broader sense than the merely personal, Presi-
dent James will rank as one of the great figures in the development of
American culture, both in the field of scholarly research and the
domain of education—what I call the "Higher Pedagogy." In the field
of scientific studies the greatest of President James's achievements was
his important services in the formation of the American Economic
Association in 1886. Said Professor James on that occasion: "We do
not regard (the state) as a merely inactive factor, the influence of
which is most happy when it is smallest, but we recognize that some of
the most necessary functions of a civilized state can be performed only
by the State, and some others most efficiently by the State— that the
State, in a word, is a permanent catalog of economic life and not merely
a temporary crutch which may be cast away when Society becomes
more perfect."2
'Delivered March 31, 1942.
'Publications of the American Economic Association, Vol. I, p. 26.
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The second great contribution of President James, I need not
remind this audience, was his contribution to public education. Without
disparagement of the great work of others, the State of Illinois and
public education in general owe a great debt to President James for
his masterly activities in broadening and deepening the foundations of
the University of Illinois. In true Jeffersonian fashion, Dr. James not
only declared fundamental principles of action, but he translated these
principles into practical results of enduring value.
Before launching into a discussion of Post-War Planning, I wish
to say a word about the National Resources Planning Board which has
been placed in charge of post-war planning by the President of the
United States. The N.R.P.B. grew out of recommendations made by
President Hoover's commission on "Recent Social Trends" in 1933.
After long study, the Commission recommended at that time the forma-
tion of an advisory committee or council for the purpose of considering
long-range trends of the social order—economic, governmental, edu-
cational, technical, and cultural— in their interrelation and always in
the light of the trends and possibilities of modern science. Since 1933,
the N.R.P.B. has been following out these general directions.
The present membership of the Board consists of Frederick A.
Delano, George F. Yantis, and Charles E. Merriam. Mr. Delano, an
engineer by profession, has been President of the Burlington Railroad,
a member of the Federal Reserve Board, and from time to time,
father of the Chicago Plan, step-father of the New York City Regional
Plan, and Chairman of the Capitol Park and Planning Commission in
Washington. Mr. Yantis, of Olympia, Washington, is a lawyer by pro-
fession, one-time speaker of the House of Representatives in Wash-
ington, and for a number of years Chairman of the Pacific Northwest
Regional Planning Commission. Mr. Merriam, as you perhaps know,
is a student of government with some experience in political action.
In addition, there are two Advisors who were drawn from members
of the Board. These are Dr. Beardsley Ruml, Treasurer of Macy's
and Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank Board of New York City,
and Mr. Henry Dennison, head of the Dennison Manufacturing
Company, Framingham, Mass., and author of important works in the
field of industrial engineering.
The N.R.P.B. is a part of the Executive Office of the President,
set up in 1939 as a result of long studies in the field of governmental
reorganization.
When the President submitted Reorganization Plan No. 1, he in-
formed Congress of his purpose to bring the managerial agencies
together in the Executive Office in these words:
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In my message to the Congress of January 12, 1937, in discussing the prob-
lem of how to improve the administrative management of the executive
branch, I transmitted with my approval certain recommendations for
strengthening and developing the management arms of the President.
Those three management arms deal with (1) budget, and efficiency research,
(2) planning, and (3) personnel. My accumulated experience during the
two years since that time has deepened my conviction that it is necessary
for the President to have direct access to these managerial agencies in
order that he may have the machinery to enable him to carry out his con-
stitutional responsibility and in order that he may be able to control ex-
penditures, to increase efficiency, to eliminate overlapping and duplication
of effort, and to be able to get the information which will permit him the
better to advise the Congress concerning the state of the Union and the
program of the Government. . . .
In this manner, the President will be given for the first time direct
access to the three principal necessary management agencies of the Gov-
ernment. None of the three belongs in any existing department. With their
assistance, and with this reorganization, it will be possible for the Presi-
dent to continue the task of making investigations of the organization of
the Government in order to control expenditures, increase efficiency, and
eliminate overlapping.
Thus, the Executive Office is made up of the agencies exercising,
in the President's name and by his own authority, the managerial
functions, and in addition to these, a division into which may be
brought, in times of emergency, functions which ordinarily may be
delegated but which become a direct responsibility of the President
in a crisis.
I can not on this occasion undertake to discuss in any detail either
the organization or activities of the Board. 1 It should be said, however,
that the Board is essentially a civilian general staff corresponding
roughly to the general staff in military affairs. The N.R.P.B. is not an
operating agency, but an advisory agency. It serves as a clearing house
for planning agencies in the federal government and in state and local
governments, bringing together their projects and proposals and en-
deavoring to integrate them as far as possible. Translation of over-all
planning into action is of course the administrative responsibility of
the Chief Executive and depends finally, to be sure, upon the decision
of the Congress. Each agency plans, and should plan, only for the
activities within its own jurisdiction. It is the function of the Resources
Board to clear these plans or programs so that they do not run afoul of
each other, to fit together plans that otherwise might not fit, and to
take an over-all view of the work of the special operating agencies.
Examples of such coordination of plans are the development of the
*See N.R.P.B. by Charles E. Merriam, Public Administration Review, Vol.
I, pp. 116-121.
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multiple use of water instead of the single uses planned through a
series of scattered agencies dealing with water; the land retirement
and land reclamation policy which obviously interests two of the
departments and many other agencies; a long-time program for public
works which spreads over and involves the cooperation of practically
all of the agencies of the government; the long-term relief policy; and
the development of population studies.
The planning function is, of course, advisory in its nature, with no
power to command or to give orders. In the report of the Committee
on Administrative Management it was suggested that there be three
joint congressional committees corresponding to the three agencies of
over-all administrative management: budget, personnel, and planning.
We suggested that through these agencies Congress might get a very
clear and a very quick view of what was happening in the field of
overhead administrative management. This suggestion has not yet
been carried out.
President Roosevelt declares that "We are going to win the war and
we are going to win the peace that follows."
To win the War, American energies are now directed toward the
development of a vast production program, toward the mobilization as
swiftly as possible of all the resources of the Nation, in materials and
personnel, and toward aid for the democracies of the world in our joint
struggle against aggression.
To win the Peace, we must prepare now—even while we are con-
centrating on winning the war. In a very real sense the clarification of
the objectives in the onward march of freedom-loving people is an
essential of our war effort. We are intent on winning this war to safe-
guard our lives and our liberties and to make possible the "pursuit of
happiness,"—the full fruition of our hopes and plans for progress and
development.
We must fight the despotisms and all their forces, not only with
greater force, but with ideas and faith. We must develop and hold out
to the enslaved people now under the heel of the dictators a better
way of life than we or they have had.
One thing is sure—we are not going back to where we were. One of
the few certainties in the world is inevitable change. We could not stop
the march of progress if we wanted to. We are going forward with
restored confidence in the democracy and liberty which underlie our
civilization. But we can do something about the direction of the changes
that will follow victory. For that reason we propose to plan ahead.
In November, 1940, the President requested the Board to under-
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take a study of what was then called post-defense planning. Later
(January 4, 1941) the President wrote:
I am glad to know that the Board is proceeding with the development of
plans and proposals for the post-defense period. These plans will, of course,
involve many Federal agencies and cooperation with state and local gov-
ernments and private citizens, and I hope all executive agencies of the
Government will assist you in collating proposals for my consideration.
In this work, the Board recognizes the principle recently stated by
Governor Leverett Saltonstall, of Massachusetts, who, on appointing
a Post-Defense Stabilization Board for his State, said:
Although the most pressing job at present is speeding up production of
defense materials and strengthening our armed forces, it is imperative to
begin planning for the tremendous economic and social readjustments
which must be made after the war. Knowledge that careful plans are being
laid for the future will have an important bearing on defense work itself
because there is nothing like confidence of security for strengthening
morale, and thus giving renewed energy to wartime production.
New Objectives
We look forward to securing, through planning and cooperative action,
a greater freedom for the American people. Great changes have come
in our century with the industrial revolution, the rapid settlement of
the continent, the development of technology, the acceleration of
transportation and communication, the growth of modern capitalism,
and the rise of the national state with its economic programs. Too few
corresponding adjustments have been made in our provisions for
human freedom. In spite of all these changes, that great manifesto, the
Bill of Rights, has stood unshaken a hundred and fifty years. And now
to the old freedoms we must add new freedoms and restate our ob-
jectives in modern terms, preserving our great gains and adding to the
heritage we received from our forefathers.
Freedom of speech and expression, freedom to worship, free-
dom from want, and freedom from fear— , these are the universals
of human life.
The translation of freedom into modern terms applicable to the
people of the United States includes, as the N.R.P.B. sees it, the
following declaration of rights:
1. The right to work, usefully and creatively through the productive
years;
2. The right to fair pay, adequate to command the necessities and
amenities of life in exchange for work, ideas, thrift, and other socially
valuable service;
3. The right to adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care;
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4. The right to security, with freedom from fear of old age, want,
dependency, sickness, unemployment, and accident;
5. The right to live in a system of free enterprise, free from com-
pulsory labor, irresponsible private power, arbitrary public authority, and
unregulated monopolies;
6. The right to come and go, to speak or to be silent, free from the
spyings of secret political police;
7. The right to equality before the law, with equal access to justice in
fact;
8. The right to education, for work, for citizenship, and for personal
growth and happiness; and
9. The right to rest, recreation, and adventure; the opportunity to
enjoy life and take part in an advancing civilization.
These rights and opportunities we want for ourselves and for our
children now and when this war is over. They go beyond the political
forms and freedoms for which our ancestors fought and which they
handed on to us. They are adapted to a new world in which the central
problems arise from new kinds of pressures of power, production, and
population, of a kind which our forefathers did not face.
Their problem was freedom and the production of wealth, the
building of a great section of this continent with its farms, industries,
transportation, and power. Ours is for greater productivity and more
democratic distribution of abundance. But in formulating these new
rights, we are not blind to the obligations which go with every right,
obligations of the individual to use well his rights and to insist on the
same rights for others, and obligations of the community to support
and protect the institutions which make these rights actual. We believe
that the American people are ready to assume these obligations and
to take the private and the public action they impose.
From time to time our Board will address itself to the task of
making good each of these propositions in concrete and practical ways.
Preliminary Objectives
The central objectives of our post-war planning may be summarized
as follows:
1. We must plan for full employment, for maintaining the national
income at 100 billion dollars a year, at least, rather than to let it slip back
to 80, or 70, or 60 billion dollars again. In other words, we shall plan to
balance our national production-consumption budget at a high level with
full employment, not at a low level with mass unemployment.
2. We must plan to do this without requiring work from youth who
should be in school, the aged who should be relieved if they wish it, and
women who choose to make their contribution in the home, and without
asking anyone to work regularly in mines, factories, transportation, or
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offices more than 40 hours a week or 50 weeks a year, or to sacrifice the
wage standards which have been set.
3. We must plan to decentralize post-emergency activities as far as
possible; to use to the utmost our system of modified free enterprise with
its voluntary employment, its special reward for effort, imagination, and
improvement, its elasticity and competition; and to advance cooperatively
under national and governmental leadership.
4. We must plan to enable every human being within our boundaries
to realize progressively the promise of American life in food, shelter,
clothing, medical care, education, work, rest, home life, opportunity to
advance, adventure, and the basic freedoms.
5. We must plan to make Up-Building America the keynote of the
post-war program, including both development of our national resources
adding to the National Estate, and service activities, which will increase
the vitality, health, skill, productivity, knowledge, and happiness of the
American people, and thus together end unemployment and add to our
wealth and well-being.
Full employment is a key to national prosperity as well as individual
welfare in the modern world of power, machinery, labor specialization,
and technology. The full employment we Americans seek must be, at
the same time, free employment, unless we are to accept a new kind of
economic slavery and lose those freedoms without which even material
prosperity is not worth the price to men who cherish freedom and the
dignity of man.
In this time of crisis, when we are fighting to defend our freedoms
and our rights, our way of life, and our scale of values, we must not
fail to take stock of the problems of full employment which we shall
face again, when this world war is over, and we can turn once more
from defense to peace, confident of our national security.
With total war we are building up our production to unprecedented
heights. Already we have more men and women at work, more wheels
turning, more power being used, more freight moving, more shipways
full, more goods being turned out, more workers in training and getting
jobs, more commodities being purchased than ever before in our na-
tional history. In spite of awkward blockages here and there arising
from the hasty and unbalanced character of this advance, we shall go
on along these same lines, building up our total production until the
Axis collapses and the threat of aggression against us is ended.
Plans and Programs
In discharge of its responsibility, the National Resources Planning
Board serves as a clearing house to gather ideas and plans to stimulate
appropriate independent action by other public and private agencies, to
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bring together individuals who are interested in harmonizing their
views, and to furnish the President with information and assistance on
the formulation of policies on these matters.
The elected representatives of the people will, of course, make the
decisions on policies and methods for meeting the problems of the post-
defense period. The Congress has already provided appropriations for
the inauguration of needed studies by this Board and for the prepara-
tion of post-war plans by various other agencies in the Executive
Branch. With full public discussion and appraisal, the Congress will
determine the appropriate policies and how they shall be put into action.
It is the established policy of the National Resources Planning
Board to carry on its work in cooperation with Federal and other
agencies having operating responsibilities. This is not in any sense
duplication of the work done by others, but putting the various plans
and pieces together and, of course, filling in many gaps.
The Board will not attempt to make plans for other agencies within
their field of independent responsibility. It will seek, as in the past,
to persuade other agencies to prepare plans and to draw these plans
together. The Board needs and requests help and cooperation of offi-
cial and unofficial agencies and bodies in assembling the plans for
dealing with the needs of the post-defense period.
In fields where no formal interdepartmental committee has been
established, the staff of the Board maintains close relations with all
interested agencies. Wherever possible, major studies are performed
directly by the appropriate agency rather than by the Board's own
staff. In addition to the cooperative relations existing in specific fields
of interest, the Board and its staff is keeping in close touch with post-
war planning work throughout the Government and by private agencies.
Method of Operation
There is a wide range of programs, and the N.R.P.B. has Dr. Luther
Gulick as Coordinator of these various planning efforts.
Plans for Demobilization
The demobilization of the armed forces of the Nation must be as
carefully planned as their recruitment. The Selective Service Act of
1940 directed that arrangements be made for the return to previous
employment of all men called for service with the armed forces of the
Government. A Re-employment Division in the Selective Service Sys-
tem directs the work of re-employment committees in various localities
who cooperate in replacing selectees released from service. This
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Division is planning for the future demobilization of armed forces
and also is studying potential employment demands in the post-war
period.
Much more thought will be given to the problem of the way of
demobilization than has been hitherto thought necessary. The defense
and war programs have involved tremendous efforts to develop new
skills and trained personnel for a great variety of industrial activities.
The same procedures might be adapted to preparing men, while still
in the armed forces, to assume jobs in industry when they are released
from the Army or Navy. Perhaps the idea of a "dismissal wage or
allowance" for those employed in industry is also applicable to
demobilized men from the armed forces.
This time we shall not be in such haste as in 1918. Our total war
effort now will loom much larger in the national economy than it did
in 1918. Any hasty curtailment of war production may have severe
repercussions throughout our entire economy. Indeed, it is conceivable
that it would be less wasteful to continue some war production even
after the immediate demand is ended rather than to halt precipitately
that production. If we are going to retrain men from the armed forces
or from defense industries for peacetime jobs, we might appropriately
consider retooling or converting our machines and plans to produce
peacetime goods.
Not alone would the immediate worker in war industries thrown
out of work be affected by hasty industrial demobilization, but trans-
portation workers and the suppliers of raw materials for war produc-
tion would also be affected. Their income would drop and hence their
consumer demands be lessened. While we may want to give priority in
the post-war period to consumer goods rather than defense goods,
industrial demobilization might still proceed gradually.
Studies are being made by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of de-
mobilization experience after November 11, 1918; of trends in pro-
ductivity in terms of man-hours and of the size, age, and composition of
the labor force. Data collected by the Bureau on labor force require-
ments for various kinds of work will be useful in projecting training
and vocational needs in the post-war economy.
The Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce of the Department
of Commerce is giving special attention to shifts in productive activity
occasioned by the war and defense programs and the possible transi-
tional requirements in both consumer and producer goods. The possible
extent of a "back-log" of consumer demand following the immediate
cessation of the defense program is being examined.
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The mobilization of our resources has involved the establishment of
government controls over allocations of materials, prices, and priorities
to meet war problems. The demobilization of our war effort and the
shift from full employment on defense to full employment in peace
will involve some of the same kinds of problems. The adaptation of
the government controls to these ends must be planned ahead.
Plans can be laid now in order that we may have an orderly and
economical procedure for demobilization. Even as the attention of a
large number of Army officers and civilians should in peacetime be
given to the problems of wartime industrial mobilization, so in time of
war production we may think about demobilization for peacetime.
Public Works
The timing of public activities to reduce the intensity of booms and
depressions has long been advocated by economists. In 193 1, Congress
adopted the policy "of arranging the construction of public works as
far as possible in such a manner as would assist in the stabilization of
industry and employment through proper timing of such construction."
The President has stated repeatedly that we must slow down on ex-
penditures for development projects which are not related to defense in
order that our full national energy can be concentrated on the war
effort, but he has also pointed out that now is the time to prepare the
plans so that the projects which are temporarily "put on the shelf" or
in "the pantry closet" can be ready when our energies can again be
used for the development of our national resources and of our standard
of living.
The National Resources Planning Board is responsible under the
law for bringing together the Six-Year Programs of Federal Agencies,
and the current record of those programs has been duly made public.
In addition, a Public Works Reserve is being developed now. This will
include programs of useful public work projects and public services
planned by state and local governments.
To make these programs and projects useful and effective at short
notice the Board last year put forward eight recommendations—one
of which has reached the point of action by the Congress. For the
advance preparation of needed surveys and investigations, programs
and comprehensive plans, engineering plans and specifications, and
legal studies—appropriations are needed under an amended form of
the Employment Stabilization Act (H. R. 5638 and S. 1617). This step
has already been taken in New York State, where systematic and
energetic steps are being taken to prepare a notable post-war program
of works.
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But there are many broader opportunities than individual public
works.
i. Urban Conservation and Development. After the war we can
rebuild our housing facilities and really get at the job of eradicating
the slum and blighted areas from our cities
—
great and small. A unit
of the Board's staff is developing materials on needed steps in govern-
ment procedures, metropolitan cooperation, land acquisition, etc., to
implement a new action program, and in this work is building on the
previous reports of the Board. 1 Procedures are now being worked out
for the progressive planning of the many facilities which are required
for modern urban living. Charles Ascher's recent report2 on this
problem points the way to important advances.
2. Rural Works and Land Use. In rural areas there are correspond-
ing opportunities for new enterprise—conserving our soil, rebuilding
and operating our forest resources, developing the range, and opening
recreational developments. The Land Committee of the Board has
developed statements of criteria to assist in the evaluation of public
work proposals. The Committee's staff is at work measuring the extent
of changes in agricultural land use and acreage requirements in order
to provide our population with an adequate nutritious diet.
The Secretary of Agriculture has created an Inter-bureau Coordi-
nating Committee on Post-Defense Programs with representatives
from various agencies within the Department of Agriculture. A sub-
committee on agricultural-industrial relations is concerned with the
influence of future industrial activity upon agricultural production and
welfare. Another is studying the problems of maintenance of desired
levels of income for agriculture in relation to high levels of domestic
consumption and industrial use of farm products.
A second subcommittee within the Department of Agriculture is
concerned with the development of a shelf of public works projects to
meet the needs of rural areas. For one thing, increased attention will
be given to the restoration and development of the physical resources
upon which agriculture depends. Soil conservation, flood control, re-
forestation, irrigation are all required phases of a program to enable
the nation to pass on to future generations not a depleted but an en-
riched soil base. In the second place there is a need for many new and
improved public facilities for people in rural areas
—
public schools,
hospitals, and sanitation and recreational facilities. Thirdly, much re-
J
"Our Cities"—Urban Government; Urban Planning and Land Policies;
Housing, the Continuing Problem ; Federal Aids to Local Planning ; and Public
Land Acquisition—Urban.
2Charles Ascher, "Better Cities."
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mains to be done in bringing electric power to the nation's farms and
in improving rural housing standards.
In addition to the Inter-bureau Coordinating Committee in Wash-
ington, the Secretary of Agriculture has set up nine regional com-
mittees throughout the United States made up of representatives from
various agencies of the department. These regional committees will
carry on the same kind of work for the region as the national com-
mittee and will serve as a link between Washington and state and local
planning bodies.
3. Industrial Development. The success of the Tennessee Valley
Authority in building private business in the area which it serves
naturally suggests similar programs for other drainage basins to pro-
vide multiple purpose development of their resources. Such programs
may provide a way of stimulating both the social and economic prog-
ress of industries and areas in the United States. Many plans already
exist for such development and others are in the making. But they
need to be tied together and put in orderly programs if they are to be
effectuated promptly on the return of peace. The undeveloped resources
of the United States provide material for vast increases in our national
income and for significant changes in the growth of industries and
of areas.
Transportation. There will be major developments in the transpor-
tation field after the war in order to provide a mainspring for other
kinds of developmental work throughout the nation. The forthcoming
report of the Board on National Transportation Policies provides a
basis for further post-war transportation plans. New rail facilities,
particularly terminals, new highways, new airways and airports, new
shipping facilities, will all be required with new equipment and oper-
ating techniques fitted to the rapid advances in technology.
Many agencies in the Government are directly concerned with these
post-war transportation plans. The Public Roads Administration is at
work on Inter-regional highway studies and other projects; the Inter-
state Commerce Commission has many responsibilities in the field. The
United States Maritime Commission, which has enlarged its ten-year-
old program for the construction of some five hundred merchant
vessels, is planning to make various studies of the demobilization of
emergency shipping construction and the possible place of the United
States in international shipping in the post-war world.
Services. But the Public Works Programs alone are not likely to
be sufficient to meet a post-war crisis. There is a wide variety of service
activities for the direct benefit and welfare of citizens which must and
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can be expanded if we are to realize the standards of living and well-
being that we desire and that our national income makes possible.
i. Health, Nutrition, and Medical Care. Increasingly in the last few
years the United States has come to realize that one of its greatest
resources is a healthy people. The medical examination of young men
for service in the armed forces has indicated many gaps in our pro-
gram. In the first place, a healthy nation depends upon a proper diet
of adequate nutritional standards. Because of the war emergency
special efforts have been launched by the Office of Defense, Health,
Welfare, and Selected Activities to inform our people about dietary
needs. The Surplus Marketing Administration has been broadening
its efforts to bring nutritional foods to low-income and needy families.
We must plan to make sure that every person in the United States
has the proper amount and kind of food.
Our advances in preventive medicine technique have already done
much to eliminate the sources of infectious disease and to prevent the
spread of contagious disease. The United States Public Health Service,
in cooperation with state and local government health departments, has
led the way. None the less, there remains much to be done to provide
adequate health education and to bring about a more completely satis-
factory preventive practice. Moreover, a number of recent inquiries un-
der both public and private auspices have revealed that large portions
of our population do not receive proper medical and dental care. We
must plan to insure that every person in the United States receives
the medical attention he requires in order to maintain bodily health.
2. Education. The goal for our educational efforts must be the
lOO% provision of training for every child and youth, the kind best
adapted to his abilities and in the amount calculated to develop his
maximum usefulness to himself, his community, and society. We know
that we are yet far short of reaching that 100% goal. Educational op-
portunities are not equal in the United States but vary greatly between
regions and even within states. And curricula have not always been
adapted to the needs of the individual student. We expect our educa-
tional system to impart to all a sense of our cultural heritage and of
responsibility for participation in our democratic society. In the sec-
ond place, education should prepare each person to take his proper
place in productive effort. And either through the educational system or
otherwise, youth must be given an opportunity to participate in and
contribute to social accomplishment. The future of our democracy
depends in no small part upon the provision we make for training
youth in the ways and needs of our society.
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A unit of the Board's staff on Youth and Educational Problems
has been created to assist in the preparation of desirable plans in this
part of the broad area of the social services in cooperation with other
agencies of the Government.
Especially must we plan to bridge over more successfully than we
do now the gulf between youth and maturity, at all the numerous and
difficult points where adjustment is most severe. Youth as it enters the
zone of maturity with all the doubts and fears of the novitiate should
be able to see stretching out before it the minimum securities as well as
the adventures of human life. Youth should not look into a future
dominated by fear—in an atmosphere of brutal hazing, so to speak
—
but look forward with confident expectation to social justice, liberty,
fair participation in the gains of our common life, in the common good
of our time—to a job, to status, to recognition dependent on ability and
intentions and will, not on the prestige of others. I am not able at this
time to do more than outline an item on the agenda of democracy, and
to indicate the wide-ranging importance of this problem. Much more
serious consideration of this problem is urgent, and indeed, is under
way. Various types of approach are of great significance—the CCC, the
NYA, the army training, the summer and work camps, our vast educa-
tional and formal training systems. We may reasonably look forward
toward and diligently plan for important modifications in the transition
from the status of youth to the status of maturity and full participation
in the duties and responsibilities and opportunities of American life.
3. Recreation. Today our society accepts the forty-hour working
week as the standard length of time for a man's productive efforts.
During the war period this may have to be lengthened, although the
basic forty hours remains. Our present knowledge of fatigue indicates
that short working days may often be more productive per worker
than long ones. In the post-war period doubtless we shall return to
the forty-hour work week, and even look forward to the time when
increasing production and technological improvements will make pos-
sible shorter hours. But this is not the only reason why we must be
concerned about ample recreational facilities for men's leisure-time
activities. We can not expect youth to grow into useful, productive
citizens of our society unless they have had satisfactory recreational
opportunities. We must build our facilities, both within and near our
great urban centers. Also, we must provide competent recreational
leadership. We know today that recreation is a matter of more than
park space and play equipment—it is participation in group enjoyment
and group activity, development of handicrafts and hobbies, community
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enterprises, dancing, organized athletic events, etc. The desire of all
to enjoy and use natural locations of scenic beauty alone or in company
must be recognized and satisfied. We have made a beginning, especially
in recent years, toward achieving these ends. In the post-war period
we shall have new opportunities to bring recreational facilities and
services to all, within our national income limits.
Other Service Activities must also be planned. With increasing
leisure and advancing standards of living there will unquestionably be
greater demands for library services. Our modern civilization has
already taken important steps toward making art, music, and the
theatre a part of the life of all citizens, instead of a luxury for a few.
We must promote the development of our artistic resources and their
universal enjoyment.
4. Finally, research is one of our very greatest natural resources.
The use of our special skills in scientific and specialized investigation
has already contributed notably to our technological advancement. Our
hopes for ever higher standards of living depend in no small part upon
the continued support of scientific research and free inquiry. At the
end of the war we shall have more skilled workers than ever and we
shall know who and where they are. It will be possible, accordingly, to
intensify and develop science and technology even more notably than
in the past. The special research reports of the Board, and the Tech-
nical Roster set up by the Board and the Civil Service Commission,
are important steps in this direction. The Man Power Board will be
able to take a broader view of our scientific personnel than has ever
before been possible.
Plans for Security. Personal insecurity has gone hand in hand with
an insecure and troubled world that has led to war. In the peace we
seek, after the present hostilities, we must plan to give the individual in
society the sense of security he has lacked. With full employment,
which we propose should be established, many of the problems of
insecurity disappear. But not all, for there will still be many gaps in
that continuity of income which is essential to security. In recent years
this country has taken important steps toward providing certain re-
assurances to persons unable by the force of circumstance to provide
adequately for themselves. Compensation schemes for injury and
death arising out of a man's occupation have been in force in nearly
every state for a number of years. In the last few years we have added
unemployment compensation, old age and survivor's insurance, and care
for the blind, the handicapped, and dependent children, and special aid
for dependents of those in the armed services. These schemes of social
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security need expansion and improvement. Work relief, general relief,
and old-age assistance have been our answer to the challenge of
dependency.
We propose to plan our national activities so that they will ensure
the maximum utilization of our most important resource of all—our
manpower. If we do so, we may look forward to a minimum of
dependency upon general public welfare measures. We wish to use all
who are capable of and available for work in our national productive
effort.
There will continue to be some unemployment in view of techno-
logical development bringing us higher levels of output. The imme-
diate labor displacement will have to be carried by the community
until it can be absorbed elsewhere in our productive activity. There
will be periods of movement from one kind of employment to another,
and seasonal fluctuations in the level of employment. We must see to
it that we have an adequate system of security for all persons affected
by such changes.
Whether employed, partially employed, or unemployed, every fam-
ily is in need of certain indispensable requirements of food, shelter,
clothing, and other comforts. We shall be able to provide them in the
post-war period. We plan to do so. The forthcoming report of the
Board's Committee on Long-Range Work and Relief Policies will
provide a basing point for the further development of welfare plans.
The Administrator of the Federal Security Agency in July, 1941,
appointed an intra-agency committee on long-range planning. This
committee has begun the preparation of long-term programs for the
development of community services in the fields of education and youth
welfare, health, nutrition, recreation, and public welfare. Much of the
work in the preparation of these plans is done within constituent or-
ganizations of the Federal Security Agency and then cleared through
the Agency.
A subcommittee within the Department of Agriculture is concerned
with the adequate provision of welfare services to the rural population.
Methods for raising the general standard of living of farm people are
under consideration, as well as programs for providing adequate
nutrition, education, and medical care.
Participation in Planning by Various Governments. In the develop-
ment of post-war programs, the wider range of participation is sought.
There is need for plans and action programs not only on the national
level, but also by states, communities, private citizens, local enterprises,
and professional groups. Each area can look ahead to participation in
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the national post-defense effort previously outlined: new housing,
power and rural electrification, expanded highway, railroad, and air-
port facilities, reclamation and conservation projects, new industries,
adequate educational, health, welfare, nutritional, recreation, and cul-
tural facilities and services. What post-war developments each area
can undertake will depend on its needs and the ingenuity and fore-
sight with which it places the use of its resources to provide for them.
For my part, I look forward to notable developments in many sections
of the United States, hitherto relatively underdeveloped. We have just
begun the optimum use of many of our potential resources.
For many years in the state planning boards, numerous city and
county planning agencies have inventoried the resources of their areas
and studied the problems involved in their more effective use to in-
creasing living standards and to providing full employment. A vast
amount of research has also been done for specific areas by other
governmental agencies, federal, state, and local. Plans and action pro-
grams have been prepared by all these agencies. Correlation of avail-
able information and plans for the development of each part of the
country with due regard to resources and manpower will produce a
substantial backlog of post-war plans for upbuilding the nation.
Each city and county can contribute to post-war reconstruction by
starting now with the preparation of plans for the material develop-
ment and service activities which are needed to make it a prosperous
community. The National Resources Planning Board therefore urges
the appointment of official planning agencies or groups, where these do
not exist, to undertake this task. Through regional and state planning
agencies, and through the field offices of the Board, assistance can be
had in relating local planning activities to state, regional, and national
programs. Special advice can be obtained from various federal and
state agencies concerned with technical problems. It is hoped that each
local area will prepare plans for post-war developments, including:
(i) reconstruction of blighted areas and new housing, (2) highways,
airports, rail and bus terminal facilities, (3) industrial development,
(4) conservation and improved use of land, and (5) health, educa-
tional, and recreational facilities and services.
There are those who find in any policy of public work or publicly
supplied services only a form of waste and spending. Sound planning
is not spending but saving. Sound planning of natural resources con-
serves and develops them. Sound planning of human resources like-
wise conserves and develops human effort. Soil and oil, coal and
timber, do not suffer from planning but from the lack of it. Attention
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given to education, to health, to recreation is not spending but invest-
ment in human resources. Full employment and continuing income are
not forms of national waste which must be cut down, but forms of
national saving of our basic resources.
An individual, a city, or a nation is penny wise and pound foolish
if it does not look to the conservation of assets and the most prudent
forms of their development. Of those who sincerely attempt to econ-
omize by eliminating all planning, we can merely say in scriptural
language: "Forgive them, for they know not what they do."
In all of the feverish activities of our American governments—fed-
eral, state, and local—acting through their various branches, many new
agencies, procedures, and practices are necessarily developing. I may
say in passing that only recently, in studying some of the early planning
developments in our country, I came across an account of the first
alphabetical agency—S.U.M. Alexander Hamilton was a strong advo-
cate of the S.U.M.—"Society for Useful Manufactures." This was an
organization for the promotion of industry on a considerable scale and
was actually incorporated in the State of New Jersey.
S.U.M. led the way.
What agencies and instrumentalities will be best adapted to the
emerging need of the post-war period is a problem of basic importance
and one which we must begin to consider now. The N.R.P.B. has
already instituted such an inquiry, even while the instrumentalities and
controls are being set up—after all, the best time, is it not? Analyses
of these tendencies and suggestions for the most useful organization
of post-war activities will be prepared and presented from time to
time as a basis for discussion and action.
Great concentrations of authority have been made and at the same
time great experiments in decentralization are going on, such as the
local draft, the local rationing plans, the local air-raid protection
agencies. Much is to be learned from observation and reflection upon
these actions, that will be useful for the purposes of post-war planning.
Plans in the International Scene. From this point on the American
people will never again make the mistake of believing that we can
have prosperity while the rest of the world collapses; or peace while
the rest of the world is at war; or freedom while the rest of the world
is being enslaved. It is therefore assumed that after the war our inter-
national policy will conform to our desires for peace and the elevation
of human dignity everywhere.
The Department of State, the B.E.W., the Coordinator of Inter-
American Affairs, are agencies primarily concerned with the interna-
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tional post-war economic collaboration. These groups are at work col-
lecting and analyzing data on post-war international conditions and
relations, and forecasting alternative plans for appropriate action.
Other peoples are at work on post-war plans, and the International
Labor Office has set up a special division on this subject under the
direction of Dr. Lindsay Rogers.
The broad range of discussion on post-war plans in England grow-
ing out of many months of war experience has been admirably sum-
marized by Dr. Luther Gulick who was sent to England last summer
for that purpose. New material is constantly appearing, such as the
program of the Labor Party under discussion at this very time, also
the Conservative and Unionist Party Organization, the Liberal, Indus-
trial, and Social Reconstruction Committee, and the Archbishop of
York's "Social Justice and Economic Reconstruction." Another docu-
ment of interest is Richard Acland's "What Will It Be Like?"
The new journal Agenda provides a quarterly review of planning
developments which I commend to your consideration. It is to be
expected and to be hoped that within a short time there will appear in
this country many plans and projects for the post-war period. Plan-
ning also contains significant material on post-war efforts.
Private Enterprise and Planning. Post-war planning is by no means
the task of governments alone, but also the opportunity and the respon-
sibility of private enterprise. How to shift from the war expenditure
of some fifty-six billions to a peace economy without upsetting the
applecart is a job that will require the joint cooperative efforts of
industry7 and government, of labor and of agriculture.
The N.R.P.B. has undertaken to stimulate interest and activity in
post-war planning by agencies and individuals outside as well as inside
the governmental circle, beginning a year ago. Mr. Galloway, in his
recent publication for the Twentieth Century Foundation, gives an
impressive list of post-war planning efforts, and this list is constantly
being enlarged.
Many business leaders have been active in this field, notably Mr.
Charles E. Wilson of the General Electric. Mr. Prince's discussion
upon this subject has had wide circulation throughout the country.
The National Planning Association is now devoting special attention
to the business aspects of the post-war problem, and an elaborate pro-
gram of inquiry and action has been set up.
The Department of Commerce has organized a special committee
for the consideration especially of the business aspects of the problem
of conversion, and important results may be expected from this
undertaking.
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The groups of organized labor are showing deep interest in what
is coming after the war and the status of the vast army of industrial
workers in the coming period of reorganization and readjustment. The
same is true of the farmers. The activities of the Departments of Agri-
culture and of Labor in this area have already been noted.
It can not be too strongly stated, nor too often, that government
alone can no more win the peace than it can win the war alone. The
shifting of the national income from one-half war expenditure or even
more; the shifting of millions of war workers, the conversion of many
industries; the shifts of capital; the reorientation of many communi-
ties from a war to a peace basis—these vast undertakings require the
fullest cooperation, the broadest good will, the keenest intelligence,
and the soundest judgment of the nation. Without this, colossal mis-
takes may be made which will offset many of the gains of the war.
War will bring us freedom from brutal aggression; and peace should
bring not only the cessation of war but the inauguration of an era of
prosperity—continuing again in national production and continual and
corresponding gains in the standard of living and in the satisfaction
of the higher values of human life.
We may look forward to broad zones of industrial development in
the post-war period, once our attention and energies are fully applied
to our overlooked opportunities for broader productivity. The present
war crisis is releasing unexpected possibilities in the form of new uses
of natural resources and in new types of inventiveness and skills. No
such impressive demonstration of the American industrial potential
has ever been made—a revelation in which human skills and natural
resources are happily blended. Wisely utilized in the post-war period,
these new developments, typical of American industrial genius, will be
of incalculable and lasting value.
Democracy Can Plan. I am not unaware that there are those who
maintain that however valuable planning may be, democracies are con-
stitutionally incapable of planning anything important. That only auto-
crats and despots can plan is a "lie that has become a legend." The
truth is at the opposite extreme. Democracies can plan most success-
fully for the interest of the commonwealth. The best plans are not
made by command and executed with the lash. The basis of planning
is not violence but reason, and the condition of most successful opera-
tion is not force but persuasion—cooperation—common participation in
an effort for a common goal. The more complex the operations of
society, the more difficult does it become to direct men by threats,
blows, prisons, and death. Both modern technology and modern
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knowledge of organization look with contempt on the whip and the
firing squad as accelerators of production.
That a democracy can not see well, can not learn well, can not plan
or execute anything well is only one of those ancient survivals which
label the man who utters them as either ignorant or unfriendly to the
democratic system itself. The truth is that a cooperative society, in
which the consent of the governed is the ruling principle and practice,
is able to plan more successfully than any competing form of political
organization.
Planning Now. There are those who contend that we should not plan
now, but should wait the end of the war and then begin to plan. To wait
until the war is over will be to wait until it is too late. When the war
ends, fifty-six billions of war expenditure must be diverted into
peace channels; when the war ends, thirty million war workers must be
brought back again to tasks of peace. Great industries must be reor-
ganized and reconverted. Many communities with war industries must
be reorganized. Vast dislocations of men, materials, capital, must be
resettled.
Of course the claims of men and materials for victory should and
must have priority, but there is still room and need for careful pre-
consideration of the problems that are certain to come with peace,
before the armistice brings that battling to a close. Labor, business,
and agriculture instinctively recognize this as true and begin to make
their preparations. All countries in the world recognize this and
are making their various kinds of plans for the after-the-war period.
Post-war preparation is not Utopian planning. The real Utopians
are those who refuse to recognize the necessity of taking thought in
advance; who foolishly believe that somehow the thirty million workers
will automatically fit into some perfect pattern of employment, in some
great miracle of performance.
This is a free country where men may think as they like and ex-
press views, but as for me, I prefer to take thought in advance of the
hour when trouble will descend upon us.
Alas, how true it is that nations have been ready to prepare a little
at least for war, but not to prepare for peace; and hence have often
lost the gains of war in the aftermath of peace!
Others may say: "How can you know, in view of the uncertainty
of world affairs, about the time and terms of peace; how can you
know what to plan for?" The answer given by any general staff in time
of war or peace must be that we plan for a variety of contingencies
and hope to be ready to meet whatever comes. We do not know when
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the war will end or where the treaty of peace will be signed, or what
its terms will be. We do know, however, many of the conditions we
must face, no matter what the outcome of the struggle or when. We
know that the national income must be drawn back again into the
channels of peace—in terms of military and civilian demobilization, in
terms of industrial conversion, in terms of very extensive reorganiza-
tion of industries and areas and interests of many kinds. This can not
be scoffed away. We know that it is possible to maintain a national
income of around one hundred billions, and to establish standards
of living in accordance with this national level of productivity. We
know that the propositions set forth in our bill of rights and more
specifically in the five objectives can be made first charges on the
national income in times of peace and can be achieved within the
limits of our national income and within the compass of a free society.
The state of the world at large is difficult to prognosticate, I admit,
but we count upon a jural order of the world from which the shadow
of aggression will be romoved. We reckon that the United Nations
and others may live in peace with each other for an indefinite period.
But in any case it is unlikely that we shall continue to spend half
of the national income—fifty-six billions—for war purposes. Very
important readjustments must certainly be made and preparations made
in advance for the readjustment. This is "elementary, Watson."
What We Are Fighting About
Let planners make no mistake about the nature of this titanic
world-enveloping struggle. It is not merely a war of words, or of
empires, but a fundamental battle over the ideals of civilization. The
many and the few are again at grips, determining whether an aristo-
cratic or a democratic, fraternal view of life shall prevail. Free gov-
ernment is at the bar and on the firing line.
Free society is flexible society. If it contains within itself the seeds
of destruction, it also contains the renewing and reconstructing power
of human intelligence, the human fraternal spirit. The regenerating
democratic qualities are stronger in last analysis than the dark powers
of fear, hate, cruelty, ignorance. Intelligence and idealism are not weak,
but strong and expansive, creative in the real sense of the term.
On the program of democracy is the forward and upward look, the
vision of what man might attain by human invention and adjustment in
the modern world—the standards of living, the intellectual advantages,
the sense of security, the cultural and spiritual gains, the flowering of
personalities too often crushed down in the mad rush, the fraternal
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sense of participation in a world from which the many have been
thrust out or forgotten on its outer fringes.
If all this seems revolutionary or even fantastic, we may reply that
it may be revolutionary but it is not fabulous or fantastic. Within the
framework of our resources, democratic ideals and institutions may be
made to flower now.
Before us lies, not some unrealistic Utopia, but a common-sense
world of struggle in which human and material resources have been
organized for the joint purpose of (i) maximum productivity and
(2) fair diffusion of the resulting gains.
Never were so many restless and discontented peoples under so
many flags, and so many leaders in so many scattered lands seeking for
a sign and a symbol of the good life in which their cherished and
legitimate aspirations might be realized. There is around the world a
vast upsurging movement reaching upward for recognition—of persons
and peoples everywhere. If we identify democracy with its true spirit
and aims rather than its imperfections and aberrations, we find that
fraternalism, sharing the gains of civilization, world security arising
from a world order, the intelligent and full development of human re-
sources, the guaranties of liberty and justice arising from the partici-
pation of the community in the determination of the common good,
provide the formula we seek.
It may be said, you are demanding not merely a form of political
association but a change in unchangeable human nature itself. Perhaps
this is indeed the point at which the issue should really be joined. But
if so, then both science and the angels are on the side of those who
look forward to far-reaching betterments, not in human nature but in
its organization and its possibilities of personal development through
enriched forms of association. Pestilence, war, famine, flood, and fire
—
fear, want, life that is "nasty, poor, brutish, and short," mental and
physical distress and torture—these are not decreed by nature but are
within our own power to command and control. The stream of life
forces, the waters of life, are not our grim foes dragging us down to
inexorable doom; they are ourselves for weal as well as woe. The
human spirit, through science, reason, faith, may bring light and life
and healing on its wings, if we so will.
We can not trace precisely the blueprints of emerging forms of
human association, but we can draw from human reason and experience
the outlines, blurred and marred though they may be, of a fraternal
association in which the basic assumptions of democracy provide the
framework of justice, liberty, order, welfare, peace.
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In reality the book is never closed in a democratic association. The
course of the general good moves relentlessly forward toward its own
appointed ends—sometimes in peaceful channels and again in revolu-
tionary streams and torrents of power. Life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness flow on in changing demands for human expression, for
recognition in constantly novel ways—startling often to those who for
the moment are in technical authority but who have forgotten the
source of their formal power, the bulk of the community.
I have repeatedly pointed out1 that the demand for mass participa-
tion on a fair basis in the gains of modern civilization is fundamental.
It will not long be denied. It is basic in this democratic struggle. Other
imperatives are subordinate to this over-all demand for an equitable
part of what civilization produces, not only a material part, but partici-
pation in the highest values of life. The vast population who carry the
burdens of the world are not to be denied, for they have seen the light,
and are moving toward it in many lands in many ways. Men rise to the
challenge of vastly increased productivity of goods and services in the
world of chemistry, machinery, biology, management, and organization
—in a world scene that presents to us dazzling possibilities of achieve-
ment. But they also rise to demand that these new resources shall not
be used to brutalize but to elevate life and fill it with finer meaning,
to demand just participation in these new and ever-increasing gains.
In all this groping of the disinherited for fuller recognition, we
must plan for the future—and we must plan now.
1See: New Democracy and the New Despotism, 1939, What Is Democracy,
1941, On the Agenda of Democracy, 1941.
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The democratic idea and practice faces very real difficulties and chal-
lenges. It always has. From time to time in human history democracy
as an institution has failed to solve current problems and it has been
blacked out, sometimes for long periods. Perhaps we have not tried
hard enough to know why.
Most of our attention in modern days has been given to the working
of democracy in ordinary or peace times. We have made some general
observations on the difficulties in which democracies find themselves
when plunged into war, but on the whole we have accepted more or
less uncritically the generalization that democracy and peace go hand
in hand and we have avoided or evaded the fact of war and the prac-
tice of aggression and their impact upon popular government. The
United States, for instance, has traditionally refused to face the war
manpower problem or conscription except when in extremity. It has
alternated between the belief expressed over and again "that a million
men will spring to our defense overnight" and the hope that our natural
isolation will protect us while we get together the necessary force for
our defense. The result is that we have not been ready against a pos-
sible attack in spite of the growing tendency of certain powers in the
last fifty years to attack first and explain why afterwards. Nor have
we been able to warn aggressors against action, with any real authority.
During the last decade they have believed, apparently sincerely, that
we and other democracies could not act promptly and powerfully
against a well-prepared foe who was ready to wage total war.
Today we recognize the fact that the democratic states are fighting
for the right to continue their experiment and that unless they win
now it will be a long time before we can conduct another democratic
demonstration. This may be a time and place, therefore, to draw at-
tention to a problem that is facing the American democracy at this
very moment. Currently it is a war problem but it may have reper-
cussions for years to come. Put starkly the question we face in this
country is how to use our manpower for victory and by what process.
Moreover, can the process conform to our traditional ideas of what is
'Delivered March 24, 1943.
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democratic ? Furthermore, can the current experience throw light on the
use of manpower in times of peace?
For a decade preceding 1939 the United States, and other states for
that matter, found themselves with an excess of manpower and the
problem of unemployment. In fact, this spectre of unemployment was
in a very real sense responsible for the willingness of some peoples to
follow aggressive leadership into revolution and war. Preparation for
war seemed to be the answer to this widespread need for work. Locally,
and in isolated places, this solution to unemployment was undertaken
and it worked. Now we are trying out the practice on a world-wide
basis. It is the war and preparation to wage it that is responsible for
our own immediate shortage of manpower. It is bringing us face to
face with production difficulties and with the demands for men in the
armed forces. It is requiring unusual tasks of women. It is breeding
hostility between Congress and the President and it is giving the execu-
tive branch of our Government very real trouble. By many commen-
tators and editors it is declared to be the current number one American
challenge. Let us look it in the face for a brief time on this occasion.
What are some of the facts to be taken into account when we con-
sider manpower and its use in our country? To what extent, for in-
stance, is our problem complicated by strikes as alleged? In 1942,
4,565,000 man-days of work were lost to all American industry, less
than half of which were lost to war industries. The figure sounds
ominous and tremendous until it is reduced to a percentage basis. It
then becomes six one-hundredths of one per cent in so far as war in-
dustries are concerned and a little more than double that percentage
for all industrial employment. When we take the monthly average of
man-days lost by strikes in the period from 1 937-1941, we discover that
it was almost four times as high as in 1942 for all industry and more
than eight times greater than the figures for war industries alone. It
would be comforting in this time of national emergency to report no
days lost because of strikes, but it is clear that the facts do not support
the generalization that strikes are a major problem except as they
occur at critical spots.
More alarming at the moment is the phenomenon of absenteeism
which, according to testimony before a Senate Committee, causes from
ten to twenty times as many lost man-days as do strikes. We are told
that the annual time lost through absenteeism in shipyards alone is
equivalent to the time needed to build one hundred liberty ships. Too
much money to spend, dissipation over the week end, overtiredness due
to overtime worked, poor health, and accidents are given as some of the
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reasons for these lost work days. It is clear that production could be
stepped up from ten to fifteen per cent if absenteeism could be pre-
vented in one way or another. Moreover, figures seem to indicate that
our per capita production would then still be considerably less than in
England, for instance.
There has been a loss in manpower also because of shortages in
material and the difficulties of transport. Lack of housing in congested
industrial centers, labor hoarding, and the fact that the time of skilled
workers is not spread scientifically have had their effect also. At the
moment attention is being directed to the manpower dilemma of the
railroads, for it is alleged that many railroad men work only a limited
number of hours a week even while the assertion is made that there
is need for a great increase in personnel. So-called "feather bed" rules
are under attack, rules which give men pay for time not worked. A
recent report (1941), Form M-300 of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, indicates, according to Friedman {New York Times, February
16, 1943), that in time paid for and not worked in train and engine
service alone there was a waste of 50,000 man-years in 1941. Appar-
ently the rules under which railway men work date back to the days
of slow trains. The effect of these rules in this time of fast trains, if
men worked full time, would be to create a rate of compensation of
$24,000 a year for men who operate the fast streamliners since the
men are now able to earn three or four days' pay for one day worked.
It is asserted, for instance, that on the New York-Washington run
firemen are limited to nine working days a month and that three times
as many men as are necessary are employed for such service. In this
connection Friedman declares that this type of labor hoarding can not
be justified in a time of labor shortage when we are talking about com-
pulsory service and shifting labor from place to place.
Central to the manpower discussion is the conflict involved in the
recruitment of personnel by competing areas of need, the armed forces,
war industries, civilian industries, and agriculture. This is the problem
of balance. If the armed forces have free rein to declare that they will
require 11,000,000 men for the current year, we have one constant to
use for calculation. A study by the Brookings Institution indicates that
given a 1943 figure of 9,500,000 it will be necessary to increase our
current labor force b)' more than 6,000,000 workers. To approach such
a figure would require the employment of sixty per cent of the available
non-farm housewives under forty-five years of age who have no small
children and more than fifteen per cent of the youth between the ages
of fourteen and nineteen, and fifteen per cent of the normally retired
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workers. This calculation assumes further an actual work week of
forty-eight hours, at least five hours more than was worked in 1942
and eight hours more than the legal standard set up in the Fair Stand-
ards Act of 1938.
It is this conflict in the assignment or use of manpower that is
responsible for the most-discussed problem of the day. It is the reason
why we have a Manpower Commission. It is causing the Selective
Service System no end of difficulty and forcing new directives with
great frequency. It is responsible for various threats of Congressional
action and it is feeding the flames of suspicion as between the Congress
and the President, and between our civil and military establishments.
The most discussed bill which has been introduced during the cur-
rent session of Congress is H.R. 1742 by Mr. Wadsworth of New
York. This bill is popularly known as the "universal draft," for it ap-
plies compulsion in labor service after the manner of the Selective
Service Act of 1940. To date union labor, the Manpower Commission,
and the administration in general have opposed such compulsion, but
Secretary Stimson and others representing the armed forces together
with some representatives of industrial management have favored some
such compulsion. Public sentiment for a "Civilian Selective Service"
seems to be growing. In brief, the bill provides that
(1) Every person registered under the Act of 1940, and
(2) Every woman between the ages of 18 and 50 shall be liable to
personal service in the war effort according to his or her abilities. Excep-
tions are those relieved from liability under the Act of 1940, officers and
enlisted men in the armed forces, the women personnel of the armed forces,
those deferred by Selective Service, and women with minor children, em-
ployees of states and political subdivisions unless the governor consents to
such service in writing. The Selective Service System is given the respon-
sibility for administering this act under the Chairman of the War Man-
power Commission, and the President is authorized to specify the numbers
needed in various employments for the effective prosecution of the war.
There are many provisos and certain reservations providing for volunteer-
ing but, in general, this bill is calculated to compel all citizens to partici-
pate in the war effort where they can be most useful. Meanwhile the
President has ordered the forty-eight hour week put into effect.
Such legislation and such procedures are in operation in other de-
mocracies at the moment and we are told that the results are good.
American traditions run counter to any such program and many assert
that such action leads straight to dictatorship— the thing we are
fighting against. It is the perennial problem of democracy in wartime.
Specifically, we wrestle with the question of how much compulsion of
the individual, whether worker or employer, is in harmony with demo-
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cratic objectives and at the same time is compatible with the highest
and most effective utilization of the manpower of the country. Just
what can men be drafted for?
We face here a confusion of counsel and of practice. We compel
service in the armed forces and set rates of pay for such service. Re-
fusal to serve means going to jail. We take property from unwilling
owners to build an industrial plant or an army camp and let the courts
decide later upon the price to be paid. In Sauk County, Wisconsin,
10,000 acres of productive farm land was taken by the Government to
build a powder plant, and farmers who had lived there all of their lives
were forced from the land and told to go somewhere else to farm. A
community of neighbors built through several generations was scattered
by this government decree over the spirited protest of the farmers.
We levy taxes as Congress sees the need on the theory that this is for
the public welfare at the moment. We enforce the Antitrust Act to
break the bottlenecks in management and labor. We require collective
bargaining in industry and even make union membership or main-
tenance compulsory in certain areas. These all are necessary, we say, to
maintain or encourage production or the use of personal services during
an emergency.
On the other hand, to date we have relied on our long-time incen-
tives of wages and price in industry and agriculture to provide the
country with manpower and its distribution and at the same time en-
courage production. Here we have hoped that the law of competition
would work out a solution. If you want labor, pay for it in the open
market; if you want pork or eggs, let price be the incentive. The result
has been an inflation which we have hoped to curb, if necessary, by
establishing ceilings in wages and prices and by a tax policy which
aims to reduce purchasing power. We are thus involved in a spiral or
cycle which it seems almost impossible to cut through. If, then, we
resort to all sorts of compulsion to make our economy work in time of
crisis, how far can we go without violating a time-honored democratic
principle of free will or action? At such a time how much operation is
private operation and how much for a public purpose and by public
direction? Food and nutrition go into the same category of war needs
and are rationed by public decree. We do not allow strikes or stoppages
in the army or in the public service but the right remains in private
employment even though that employment is in fact public work for the
time being. The alternatives are difficult and lie in the domain of public
policy. The final decision involves the question of just where and when
is compulsion democratic or violative of the democratic principle.
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Bernard Baruch tried in 1917 to resolve this conflict in his state-
ment to the effect that under American industrial organization industry
is in the hands of millions of private employers and it is operated to
make a profit. The employee thus serves a private master, and enforced
or involuntary servitude for a private master is slavery and is pro-
hibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. It would seem that such a state-
ment of principle completely disregards the realities of a war situation
in which industry does not operate for a profit in the ordinary sense.
The employer makes what the Government wants in the way that the
Government wants it and under conditions laid down by the Govern-
ment. Everything from beginning to end—materials, wages, profits,
and all the rest—is rigidly supervised by the Government and the busi-
ness is not actually private in the ordinary sense. The manufacturer,
by one device or another, is forced out of one field of production and
into another without much regard to his desires. The Government can
take over his plant—in fact, owns much of it for the time being. No,
compulsory war work would be in fact not private work but public work.
This kind of argument, however, does not resolve the prime ques-
tion of whether to mobilize manpower by voluntary or by compulsory
methods or determine whether one or the other is or is not democratic.
If the people of this country are determined to see this war through
and in their opinion it becomes necessary to conscript labor, capital, and
all of our resources, and if such a course will conserve our demo-
cratic institutions, who shall say that to make everyone share in this
task to the full extent of his abilities is an undemocratic procedure?
All that is necessary is to have a substantial unanimity of opinion for a
policy of compulsion and such a policy becomes the declaration of a
people who are united in a common effort. This declaration, by any
definition of democracy, is government by consent. The real problem
is whether such a policy will turn the trick and accelerate production.
What we want is effective action in carrying out an agreed-upon policy.
Perhaps one of our current difficulties arises from the fact that the
Selective Service Act was adopted as a measure to create a reserve
army and not one to go to the front. It was passed before we were at
war and as a compromise. It assumed that we would train something
like a million recruits a year who would then go back home to their
jobs, meanwhile making up a reserve army. We were then in the lend-
lease mood; we were to be the arsenal of democracy, and the task of
Selective Service officials was to send to army camps only those who
were not needed on the industrial or agricultural fronts. We were still
making automobiles with shiny gadgets to sell to a domestic market,
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making them in such numbers that rubber and steel inventories melted
rapidly. We were business-as-usual people and our war production was
of small moment as compared to autos, refrigerators, radios, and like
commodities. We quite forgot the sentiment which was so general after
the last war that any conscription in the future would be total—all men,
all capital, all resources. There were those in the summer of 1940 who
sent resolutions to Congress advising that any conscription should re-
quire national service from everybody and on the same terms—com-
plete registration of all from sixteen to sixty-five, complete classifica-
tion, complete assignment to tasks of national service for one year. I
myself signed such a set of resolutions believing that this was democ-
racy going the whole way and requiring like effort and like sacrifice
from everybody including the women.
But we were not sufficiently alarmed in 1940 to go all the way.
If we had waited until Pearl Harbor to take any action on Selective
Service, popular indignation and the general surge of unity that en-
gulfed us could easily have forced Congress to pass a combination of
the Selective Service Act and the currently discussed "National War
Service Act." Could the question of sending boys to the front by com-
pulsion and of putting men into factories or keeping them on the farms
by compulsion have arisen at the same time after war had been declared
upon us and after the Japanese fleet had struck, it would doubtless
have been resolved and with great enthusiasm. Fortunately we took
what we could get in 1940 and we were by so much ahead in getting
men trained for war service, but that act and practice under it together
with the use of the device of deferment put off the day when it became
necessary to re-discuss complete mobilization in the light of our recent
experience. Meanwhile employers competed for labor and materials, the
unions quite naturally and legally used the situation to increase their
bargaining power, wages and prices went up, farm boys were lured into
industry, the armed forces went into a campaign of competitive re-
cruiting, and we set competing forces into motion that have become
exceedingly complex and difficult to handle. Furthermore, various
groups and parties are on record in the premises and there are many
faces to save.
The student of American government sees this question of man-
power as a dual problem. It is both political and administrative. In so
far as the matter is one of public policy he must take the position that
the people's representatives in Congress are shouldered with the re-
sponsibility of declaring what must be done to win the war and what,
in general, is the job of each of us. They must also set the broad limits
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within which the Government is to act during the emergency, make
financial provision for the waging of war, and give some attention to
the domestic difficulties which war creates. They would do well also to
give some thought to post-war manpower challenges and it would do
great good if besides they could set an example of national unity during
a crisis. This is no time to exploit the congenital weakness of our con-
stitutional system, i.e., the lack of close and responsible relationship
between the legislative and executive branches in the area of national
governance. For it still remains true, as Woodrow Wilson pointed out,
that, in general, the Congress does not represent the nation in the sense
that the President does. He is the only one who is chosen by the nation
at large and he is the spokesman for the nation. He is responsible to the
whole people and not to a district or a state.
The manpower crisis puts upon the President the gravest responsi-
bility and it is taxing his administrative capacity to the limit. He is
importuned on every hand to resolve current shortages in favor of
industry, of agriculture, or the armed forces. He is required to de-
termine the relative needs of those who demand men and to deploy
our combined manpower for victory. These pressures are terrific. At
no time in American history has there been such a great need for push-
ing our productive capacity so hard or so constantly. Never before
have we dreamed of taking so many men out of production and into
the armed forces—eleven million to be housed, fed, armed, and trans-
ported—eleven million who perforce can not help in production in the
slightest degree—eleven million who by virtue of the active and virile
regime to which they are assigned require much more in food and cloth-
ing than if they were in civilian occupation—eleven million who are
using up the products of our factories in immense quantities and leav-
ing little of value even for scrap. These eleven million are destroying
what we make, are blowing it to bits and asking for more. The Presi-
dent, then, is confronted with one of the most delicate tasks of
balancing national need against available resources and he should be
equipped with every possible instrument for doing it. He must develop
or have developed by his aides such regulations which, when enforced,
will do the job. All other regulations or understandings of whatever
nature which cripple the use of manpower in the national interest
should be made secondary to the supreme emergency demand. It must
become possible to use men and women full time—and full time should
mean the point of highest efficiency—while the emergency is on. In the
greatest degree such disposal of manpower represents our greatest
social security and will most certainly best safeguard our social gains.
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The manpower crisis can not be resolved so long as our public policy
does not take into consideration the means by which men live. All who
work for the national interest, whether at home or at the front, should
be entitled to something like the same standards of living and equitable
real wages. There must be maintained, therefore, a reasonable relation
between those who are housed, fed and clothed, and paid in the camps
and in the factories, fields, and civil employment. The fact of immedi-
ate bargaining power ought not profit one group over another. Hence,
some real stabilization of our economy is mandatory, and only govern-
mental action can provide it. The millions who have no bargaining
power and who are not strategically placed in war industries have a call
upon the Government also. They can bring no pressure but they play
their part in the national effort. Hence, our tax policy and our economic
controls in the areas of production, prices, and compensation must be
carefully and rationally articulated with the manpower policy. Failing
this we face a period of discrimination such as we have seldom seen.
This is a time for equal sacrifice and a minimum of exploitation
through inflation.
To date these administrative tasks and responsibilities have not
been coordinated in the interest of national need. The War Production
Board has been subjected to internal competitions as between groups
representing the armed forces and industry. The rush for priorities on
raw materials has made for confusion and stoppages in production.
Valuable time and manpower have been lost because of conflict of
authority. There has been no clear line of responsibility among the
agencies dealing with the assignment and use of manpower—Army,
Navy, Selective Service, The United States Employment Service, the
various labor boards, and war and civilian industry. The railroads and
their personnel problems have been isolated almost completely from the
main current. To date we do not have reliable data on comparative
needs as, for instance, between food production and the production of
war materials. To use a military illustration, the logistics of our total
war effort have not had a proper attention. As indicated above, this is
the most delicate and explosive administrative task imaginable, and it is
particularly difficult because of certain American traditions to which
we cling and certain conceptions to which we attach particular mean-
ings. What we do today can not be judged by reference to phrases in
the Declaration of Independence but must be appraised rather by their
probable effect upon the efficiency of our war effort and the stabilizing
influences which they set in motion. There are things which must be
done in order to guarantee a reasonable chance for the perpetuation of
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our institutions and our economy. Our problems are not verbal and
semantic. They are actual and concrete. Their solutions must be prag-
matic and effective. It is overly easy at the moment to charge that we
are drifting toward dictatorship and to forget that it is despotism
which we must avoid. It is the use to which a dictatorship is put that we
must watch. Cato left the plow to receive complete authority for the
defense of Rome. He saved Rome but he founded no dynasty nor did
he abolish the privileges of the Roman citizen. The governmental con-
trols which we are now putting into the hands of the President are
necessary to our national effort. Our criticisms should go to the ques-
tion as to whether he is using them effectively enough. The job of Con-
gress today is to see to it that the President exercises his vast powers
with sanity and dispatch and that there is no impediment which will
prevent necessary action. It has the further responsibility to establish
such fiscal and taxing policies as will help to ease administrative diffi-
culties. The strategy of taxes is clearly an important phase of our over-
all war strategy but Congress has been as hesitating in this area as
has the President in cutting through certain administrative difficulties.
The truth is, of course, that we are all psychologically unprepared for
all-out governmental action and our public servants reflect this attitude.
They feel that they can not move faster than public opinion and they
hang back when they should be acting with decision and power. If a
democracy is unable to gird its loins and do every necessary thing to
ride an emergency, it has little chance to succeed in a fast-moving
mechanically organized world.
In the frame of reference in which we are tonight this generaliza-
tion means that one immediate task which we face as a people is to re-
solve our manpower crisis. To do this it seems to me that certain
decisions are inevitable. At least one of these seems to have been made
and we may use it as our one constant in the list.
(i) The over-all size of the armed forces necessary to implement
our national war aims is now given.
(2) A decision on the manpower needs of agriculture and the war
industries.
(3) A determination as to what unessential tasks can be laid aside
for the duration and what manpower will be released.
(4) What tasks have been assigned by tradition to men in uniform
which can be readily undertaken by men unfit for military service and
by women.
(5) What red tape can be cut in the Army and Navy to release
manpower for other duties. Any college controller who has been deal-
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ing with the armed forces during the past year can point to some op-
portunities.
(6) A decision to make a better and more comprehensive use of
the many negro citizens who are still asking for work.
(7) To resolve the transport personnel situation by ordinary and
common-sense revision of the restrictive rules which seem to hamper
our emergency effort.
(8) A clear administrative mandate which will place the execu-
tion of manpower policy in one responsible place. The time is long past
when we can allow various agencies or individuals the peacetime luxury
of competition for authority or for political advantage.
(9) A clear-cut decision as to what other controls in the economic
and social fields will aid in solving the manpower problem. Here are
involved wages, prices, rationing, taxes, and compulsory savings and
questions of housing, transportation, and education. The matter of
union rules and practices has an intimate relation to such decisions.
(10) A decision as to what mixture of persuasion and pressure
we are going to use in assigning working personnel and the place of
deferment in such a program.
As this is written the announcement comes from Washington that
an over-all Board has been established to go into many of these
questions and perhaps others, and we have news that certain decisions
particularly in the field of agricultural labor have been taken by the
Selective Service System in addition to the earlier directive that de-
ferment has been withdrawn from men engaged in certain unessential
activities. What is needed from the Board just established is a report
on the facts of our situation and a clear-cut program of action that can
be put into effect without delay.
It must be apparent that no one action can be taken which will solve
a problem that will be with us for the duration and for a long time to
come. We must build adequate fighting force, grow the necessary food,
and make the weapons we need. We must make minimum provision
for civilian needs. All of this means transfer of manpower wherever
necessary, a good deal of re-training, the breaking down of prejudice
in the areas of race and sex, the cessation of labor hoarding and wast-
age, and in a clear-cut scheduling of production and the use of raw
materials, besides other things already mentioned. Moreover, we must
find that balance between voluntary and required service which will fit
the psychology of the moment. Whether the current bill before Con-
gress will do this is now being debated. To date the chief inducement
to enter war work has been the wage offered. Mining and agriculture
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have suffered because they could not compete in compensation with
industry. It is evident that to equalize or balance these calls for men
some pressure will have to be applied. These may be the devices of
deferment, assignment, economic aids, or even tax pressures of various
kinds. The worker will have to go where he is most needed or be asked
to stay where he is, as the case may be. The employer will need to be
drawn into the picture, and in many cases pressure will have to be ap-
plied to him perhaps through the device of "controlled hiring." What-
ever is necessary to make possible the proper distribution of 60,000,000
workers must be done even to such an item as "nursery schools" or
"moving expenses" or a tremendous expansion of training programs.
No manpower administrator can order the impossible. The conditions
for proper administration must be met. One of these, doubtless, is the
adjournment of political strife and the unnecessary throwing overboard
of hard-won and reasonable rights or standards.
There have been charges, for instance, even on the floor of Con-
gress, that there is a surplusage of civilian employees in the Govern-
ment. There may be some truth in the allegation, but when we remem-
ber that seven-eighths of the increase in Federal employment in the
last eighteen months is in the Army and Navy arsenals, supply depots,
navy yards, docks, and construction camps, it may just be that there
is some political exaggeration in such a charge.
We should be asking at this time that those in authority see this
problem of war manpower as a whole. We can not waste time in partial
attacks on isolated or particular areas. We need the facts essential to
the determination of a sound emergency policy—then a policy which is
sane and realistic, and finally a sure-footed, competent, and thorough-
going administration of an adopted policy. Anything less is too little.
Let us hope that when we get around to the job it will not be too late.
At this moment there is confusion in the public mind as well as in
Washington and a growing insistent demand for clarification and effec-
tive action. The public is ready for any necessary solution of our man-
power problem and it will consider any program which makes sense
as in harmony with our democratic hopes and the things we are fight-
ing for. The people of this country are ready for any required joint
sacrifice. They are ready for taxes and for hard work. They ask only
for some equality of treatment—no favors and no privileges. Let us
get on with it.
One more observation is in point when we discuss democracy and
its employment of manpower. When the demobilization comes, and it
will come eventually, millions of men will return to civilian life and
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there will be a tremendous shifting from the war industries to the more
usual pursuits. Shall we repeat the experience we had after the last
war or relive the days of the early 'thirties? If we let nature take its
course we shall have a different kind of manpower crisis when the war
is over. The problem will be in reverse and we shall face unemployment
—it may be on a large scale. If we face too much demand for men
today because we are fighting a foreign foe, shall we find too little
demand when we contend only with a domestic situation ? It is none too
early to give consideration to the possibility of unemployment two or
three years hence. To those who will not plan ahead to attack this
probability or to those who will say we can not afford to do anything
about it, we must reply that we can not afford not to. We are told that
the Bourbons never learned anything and never forgot anything. There
is no place in post-war America for Bourbons or even near-Bourbons.
Let us both remember and learn.
{49}

DEMOCRATIC IDEALS:
LONDON, OTTAWA, WELLINGTON,
CANBERRA, WASHINGTON

DEMOCRATIC IDEALS:
LONDON, OTTAWA, WELLINGTON,
CANBERRA, WASHINGTON 1
By Allan Nevins
Professor of History in Columbia University
It is well for a historian, as Herodotus discovered many centuries ago,
to wander widely and to compare various nations with critical eye.
And no such wanderer can draw a better lesson from his observations
than that which Herodotus educed. Although there was little of the
philosopher in Herodotus, he laid his finger sensitively upon a funda-
mental truth. His pages chronicle the fierce struggle of the Hellenic and
Persian worlds; the struggle of reason, order, and justice against
despotism and violence. With sympathies vibrantly enlisted in behalf
of Hellenic reason, he records the temporary triumph of his own civi-
lization; and yet underneath this narrative runs a subtle voice of
warning. In the day of victory, he seems to say, be yourself chastened,
feel a wise humility, and fear the envy of the gods, the divine Nemesis.
Though it is seldom in modern times that mankind is reminded of the
divine Nemesis, as it was in Lincoln's second inaugural, this grave
warning may well be carried down the ages to our own day. Again
ordered justice battles with a tyrannous despotism ; in the moment of
our triumph let us not forget meekness and circumspection. This is
essentially what our liberal voices mean when they say that victory is
less important than the uses we make of victory; that we must forge
weapons of permanent peace no less than of war, and that a better
democratic world must be born from the conflict. Else we may learn
the force of Herodotus's warning: "The states which once were great
are now for the most part insignificant, and those that are at present
illustrious were formerly small."
A better world—and yet not too changed a world. For it is an
essential part of a wise moderation—of the avoidance of u/3pis— to be
restrained in our expectations of a post-war regeneration. Because in
every great conflict the fever-heat of patriotism temporarily burns
away much vulgarity, meanness, and selfishness, men think that human
nature is being altered for the better. Because every conflict in this
day of total war poses sharp restrictions on all economic interests, all
social groups, all bodies corporate and politic, men fancy that institu-
^elivered April 12, 1944.
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tions are being permanently reshaped. The actual fact, well illustrated
by the aftermath of every war, is that men remain just as strongly
governed by self-interest, that corporations are just as sharply con-
cerned with profits, and that the group interests of farmers, laborers,
manufacturers, and professional men are just as tough and aggressive.
The sense of national interest is not moderated, and the value that
people set on national sovereignty is even enhanced. War, meanwhile,
produces such grave distortions of the social and economic structure
that it creates more problems than it solves. If its ardors and endur-
ances bring out the best traits in the finer men and women involved,
they also bring out the worst qualities in the coarser participants.
Nations stumbling out of one set of strains, not into the expected peace
and rest, but into another set, show not only fatigue but disillusion-
ment. We shall do well, after this second World War, to hold firmly
to the main values of our democratic system as it stood before the in-
vasion of Poland, and to make a number of modest, well-considered
adjustments; to renounce the vague idea of some beneficent wartime
revolution, and put our trust in the slower, more prosaic, but more
fruitful processes of evolution.
Certainly we could make no greater error than to undervalue the
worth, taking the globe as a whole, of our pre-war democracy. To run
the gamut of the English-speaking countries during this mighty con-
flict: To live in London during the German blitz, to visit Glasgow
and Clydebank as they lay smoking in the chill winter dawn after the
bombers left, to watch the great convoys leave Halifax harbor, to see
Wellington as American marines defiled through its streets to take
ship for the Gilberts, to stand in Sydney as the Eighth Australian
Division, the heroic Rats of Tobruk, returned to their delirious country-
men, is not alone an exhilarating experience. It is instructive. It carries
home more than one truth: the truth that while the essence of true
democracy is always the same, its outer forms and even its principles
may vary widely;. that democracy in every country is shaped by its
historical experience; that one democratic land should never think ill
of the institutions of another simply because they are different; that
when democracy loses its variety and its thirst for experimentation, it
will lose its vitality; that in a world of incessant change, one demo-
cratic nation often enters upon a phase which some other land has
traversed before it, and can learn much from its neighbor's errors and
achievements. To see so many countries manifesting under wartime
pressures the peculiar virtues of democracy—a patriotism that feeds
on truth, not propaganda, and remains patriotism; a broad-based te-
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nacity; resourcefulness; the ability to produce not merely the leader
but many leaders—is a lesson in the worth of those democratic assets
which we possessed in 1939.
Ignorance and prejudice are plentiful throughout the world, and a
slight infusion of either makes it easy to decry institutions that differ
as cricket differs from baseball, and Parliament from Congress. Every
country indulges itself in such criticism. American sojourners in Great
Britain are quickly struck by the fact that many labor leaders hold
the quality of American democracy deeply suspect. They think of the
United States as a land of arrogant millionaires, conspicuous consump-
tion of the Newport or Hollywood variety, industrial speed-up systems,
hostility to labor, and gangsterism. "What do you mean by talking of
American democracy?" queried an official of the Australian Labor
Party, half-contemptuously. "You have a plutocracy!" In New Zealand
a casual reference to a privately-endowed observatory evoked a caustic
outburst from a group of student idealists. It was socially atavistic,
they said, to let lords of wealth preen their vanity by naming such uni-
versities as Stanford, Clark, or Vanderbilt after themselves; indeed,
great accumulations of pelf were outrages upon the name of democ-
racy; the state should provide all such foundations for learning. "Black
markets here?" said the New Zealand labor leader, Walsh, the most
dynamic member of the Islands' efficient triumvirate of price-control.
"This is a real democracy. We had no black markets here till some of
your soldiers taught our riff-raff to start them!"
Such reminders that there are glass panes in our own structure are
not unwholesome for a country so addicted to stone-throwing as the
United States. No nation is more sharply outspoken about democratic
shortcomings beyond the seas, so quick to cite external differences as
proof that foreign lands are not democratic at all, and so ready to
arrogate to itself the world-leadership of democracy. Analysis of the
British Government frequently touches a note of acerbity, while our
notice of the Dominions, from South Africa to Australia, is milder
only because it is more condescending. This is no new trait; it was old
when Dickens wrote of Jefferson Brick. In 1856 James Buchanan had
but newly returned from his ministership to Great Britain. He made a
speech extolling the Democratic National Convention of that year, a
gathering of markedly rowdy character which had done the nation no
greater favor than to nominate James Buchanan for President, as proof
of "your superiority over the people of other countries;" for anywhere
in Europe, he said, "the voluntary expression of the people would have
been drowned in martial music, and their actions controlled by an army
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with banners." In 1941 I watched a regiment of Canadian troops march
under full equipment from Euston Station across central London to
Victoria Station, there to entrain for their camp in southern England.
The glittering lines of full-armed men were impressive. But more im-
pressive still was the single London policeman, carrying not even a
club, who in accordance with a time-hallowed statute rode at their head.
That policeman symbolized a principle of democracy established in
Britain long before James Buchanan was born: the principle that the
civil power is always superior to the military power. In England such
reminders of the august past of important democratic principles are not
infrequent.
Americans will find it easier to appreciate their own shortcomings if
they remember that democracy has three distinct aspects. One facet is
political; and by political democracy we mean representative govern-
ment, an atmosphere of free discussion, and an accepted tradition of
compromise. Another facet is social; and by social democracy we
mean the acceptance of the egalitarian ideal of human worth—of the
principle not only that "I am as good as you are," but that "you are as
good as I am." The third facet is economic; and by economic democ-
racy we mean not equality of fortune, which is impossible and probably
undesirable, but a rough equality of opportunity and the chance to rise.
The ideal of a truly democratic country is a harmonious combination
of the three elements. The United States from the days of Washington
has had a political democracy so well-ordered, on the whole, that it
has been the envy of other peoples. Its social democracy, from the time
of the Jeffersonian and still more the Jacksonian eras, has been gener-
ally admired. But the United States has been less successful than some
other countries, and particularly several other English-speaking coun-
tries, in achieving economic democracy. During the nineteenth century
inequalities of wealth and concentrations of economic power grew up
which very clearly limited opportunity, and even weakened our political
and social democracy. If we faced this fact more frankly we should be
a little more tolerant of the shortcomings of other democratic peoples;
and it is not the only fact to be faced frankly.
Most criticism of the British system is of a familiar type. Theodore
Dreiser cut a strip from the old well-handled bolt of cloth when, visit-
ing Canada early in the war, he assailed Great Britain for permitting
so much wealth to coexist with so much poverty, for letting lines of
class become hardened into caste, and for allowing the Government to
be controlled by select aristocratic groups. Such indictments have a
musty flavor. They are based in large part upon Victorian literature,
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the social criticism written by Hyndman, William Morris, and Charles
Booth, and the idea that the Britain of 1944 is pretty much the Britain
of 1880 or 1890. Distinct elements in our hostile analysis of the British
social system, in particular, are often referable to Dickens's pictures
of slum life and Thackeray's social satire; as if American society were
to be viewed with the aid of Uncle Tom's Cabin and The Gilded Age.
The fundamental reply to any attack upon British democracy based
upon poverty, caste-lines, and the use of the old school tie in govern-
ment work is that such excrescent evils no more affect the deep inner
core of democracy than multimillionaires, gangsters, and black markets
affect that core in America. But a more direct answer will serve. It is
that the charges are no longer even partly true; that present-day
Britain is one of the most advanced democracies, politically, socially,
and economically, ever found on the globe.
If comparisons are to be drawn, let us draw them candidly. We
talk about poverty in Great Britain, and everybody who has read some
of the British Blue-Books or J. B. Priestley's eloquent English Journey
knows that the British themselves talk about it frankly. But the eco-
nomic statistician also knows that the British real income per capita,
and the British standard of living, despite the crowding of population
in one small island, have for generations been the highest in all Europe.
Every student of social legislation knows that by her old-age and de-
pendency pensions, and above all by her scheme of unemployment insur-
ance, Great Britain had by 1920 provided defenses against economic
insecurity which the United States ten years later totally lacked. After
all, Priestley's English Journey is not a whit more horrifying than Stein-
beck's Grapes of Wrath. A certain Chicago newspaper is often fiercely
denunciatory of aristocratic misgovernment in Britain. If this journal
would compare the record of the London County Council, or the cor-
porations of Glasgow, Birmingham, Toronto, Melbourne, or Sydney,
with the annals of Chicago's city government during the past fifty
years, it might moderate its self-complacent tone. In any modern
nation, the efficiency of democracy depends in large degree upon the
quality of its professional civil servants. The British Government
placed its civil service upon an austere merit basis a long generation
before the American Government rid itself of the worst spoils system
that any democracy has ever known.
If we talk of the right to the ballot, let us not talk as if the Second
Reform Bill were still pending. Today nobody in all Britain is dis-
franchised, while in one section of the United States a large part of
the adult population, by poll taxes or other discriminations, is denied
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the vote, and special interests stubbornly maintain that denial. The
assertion that in Great Britain the central government lies in the hands
of a ruling coterie of aristocratic extraction long ago lost its force.
The fact is that control of government is vested in a single mass-
elected legislative body which twice in our time has been dominated
by a Labor Party, resting upon a labor constituency, and led by labor-
union men. No American administration has ever been controlled by
labor, and none since Jackson's day has really been controlled by the
farm-interest; indeed, only three nations in the world have in any
strict sense had Labor Party governments—Great Britain, Australia,
and New Zealand.
We are told that there is a caste system in Great Britain. Fully
half of the students in the two greatest universities, Oxford and Cam-
bridge, now come from very poor homes, and live on a generous sys-
tem of state scholarships. Half of the men in the present Ministry, like
Ernest Bevin and Herbert Morrison, came from very humble workers'
homes. The roll of recent Prime Ministers contains two men, Lloyd
George and MacDonald, who began life poorer by far than any
American President since James A. Garfield began it. One prime
minister of this supposedly aristocratic land was of illegitimate birth.
Another, and one of the very greatest, of British Prime Ministers, was
a Jew, just as the present Prime Minister of Australia is a Catholic;
but when will the American democracy elect its first Catholic, or its
first Jew, to be head of the state? An Australian would find more
evidence of class distinctions in our Government than his own. The
Air Minister in Australia was long a locomotive engineer; the Navy
Minister was a pattern-maker; the Supply Minister began life as a
barber; while Prime Minister Curtin himself left school at twelve to
become a printer's devil. We might add to this circumstantial list. It
could be pointed out that Great Britain has never had a Ku Klux Klan;
that it would be almost impossible to point out a British counterpart of
Tammany Hall or the Kelly-Nash Machine; and that the general
handling of labor relations is better in Great Britain than in America
largely because the labor unions are more democratically managed. In
short, when talking of the shortcomings of British democracy we
should do well, in Dr. Johnson's phrase, to "clear our minds of cant"—
particularly a cant fifty years out of date.
An equal lack of realism inheres in most of the American suspicions
of Australasian democracy founded upon its admixture of state social-
ism. It is true that Socialism in the extreme Marxian sense, aiming
at the establishment of a classless society through the revolutionary
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erection of a dictatorship of the proletariat, is a deadly enemy of
democracy. That is, revolutionary collectivism is violently anti-demo-
cratic. But what we encounter in the Antipodes is of a very different
color. State interventionism of the mild sort which in the decade before
the war elected so-called Socialist governments in Denmark, Norway,
and Sweden, which swayed the councils of the Labor Party in Britain,
New Zealand, and Australia, and which found its ideas expressed by
British Fabianism and German Revisionism, is not antipathetic to
democracy, but reconcilable with it. A scheme of state socialism may be
dictatorial in character ; it may be democratic in character. In Russia
it was dictatorial, in Scandinavia democratic. Young Australians, as I
have pointed out, even deny that democracy can be effective without a
generous element of state socialism. At any rate, the Australasian
schemes in this field are imposed by democratic means, subject to
democratic discussion, implemented in a democratic way, and dedicated
to the democratic principle that the protection and development of the
individual is the chief aim of government.
Indeed, since the various experiments in state control introduced by
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, and the experiments in
state intervention sponsored by Herbert Hoover and Franklin D.
Roosevelt, criticism of Australian experiments as necessarily undemo-
cratic sounds rather quaint. An American seaman, Captain Joseph
Slocum, records in his book Sailing Around the World, that on his
arrival in South Africa he went to talk with President Paul Kruger in
Pretoria. Kruger always held that the world was flat; Captain Slocum
had just sailed around the world; but still Kruger insisted that the
world was flat. Ever since Mr. Hoover's creation of the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation as a great democratic instrument for restoring our
economic balance, the Americans who hold state intervention undemo-
cratic have been very much in Kruger's position.
It is a profoundly reassuring fact that before this war democracy,
which we know was essentially healthy in the United States, was essen-
tially healthy also in Britain, in Canada, in South Africa, in New
Zealand, and in Australia. In all these countries democracy had its
innumerable defects and its recurrent crisis. It made progress by trial
and error, and sometimes the errors seemed—and were—affrighting.
It governed by free discussion, which meant constant and ample
criticism ; and it governed also by a seesaw battle between the party in
power and the party in opposition, which usually resulted in some com-
promise that fully satisfied nobody. It was constantly under fire, and
the attack was hottest when it was pursuing its proper democratic
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mission of dealing hardly with special interests. Lord Melbourne, hav-
ing attended a sermon which denounced profane swearing, returned
home to remark to his luncheon guests: "I yield to nobody in my
admiration for the church, but things are coming to a pretty pass if
religion is going to invade the sphere of our private lives." Just so,
democracy invades many private comforts. But with all its drawbacks,
democracy, which is not an object but a method, which is not a goal
but a process, was succeeding in its primary endeavor: it was preserv-
ing individual freedom, and providing for the development of the best
human qualities. We should value its various manifestations the world
over, and cherish and improve it.
Why is it important to realize the truth that although the essence
of democracy is the same, its outer forms and even principles may
differ widely, and that when democracy loses variety and thirst for
experiment, it will perish? Why is it important for the English-speak-
ing nations to avoid the error of underrating one another's institutions
simply because they are different? Not merely for mutual good will.
Because after the war the world will require democratic leadership.
It can get it only if the democratic nations stand together in agreement
upon certain basic principles of faith. It can not get it if, hearkening
to the clamor of various designing newspapers and politicians, the
people of America, Scandinavia, Great Britain, the British Dominions,
and of a few well-qualified Latin-American republics deny one an-
other's title-deeds to freedom, and regard one another with suspicion.
Mutual understanding will be easier if these nations remember not
only that democracy has the three facets already noted
—
political, eco-
nomic, and social—but that it necessarily obeys certain laws or require-
ments. Three great requirements in particular have been impressed
upon me by my observations in the different parts of the English-
speaking world. The first is that a healthy democracy will always
harmonize with a nation's history and character, and will evolve from
generation to generation without ever breaking sharply from the na-
tional spirit. The second is that democracy, to remain successful, must
give a nation a natural unity, as distinguished from the artificial unity
of an autocracy ; and that when the nation undergoes any extreme test,
such as a grueling war, this natural unity must be made very close
indeed. The third requirement is that democracy shall give birth to its
own kind of leadership, which is characteristically (despite the some-
what misleading impression created by a Churchill or Roosevelt) the
leadership not of one man, but of a group of strong men.
What a world of misunderstanding would be avoided if, in looking
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at a sister democracy, we should interpret its institutions in simple
terms of its national history! Unless this is done, true understanding
of differences in democratic methods and principles becomes impossible.
This statement may readily be illustrated by reference to the United
States, whose democracy Sir William Beveridge, writing in the Atlan-
tic, finds rather bizarre in its distrust of government planning. Our
democracy began with two English settlements in Virginia and Massa-
chusetts. As it expanded, what were the historic forces which shaped
it? One was the moving frontier, which nurtured an independent and
individualistic spirit, a mutual tolerance among settlers of different
races and faiths, and a sense of attachment to the nation as differen-
tiated from the locality. Another shaping force was the immense
natural wealth of the country, which generated enterprise, self-reliance,
and that natural child of well-being, optimism. A third force was the
character of our immigration; an immigration not of communities,
but of individuals, and hence an individualistic movement. Still another
force was the tradition of a weak or laissez faire state, for most
settlers fled Europe to get away from the strong state. The product
of all these forces was inevitable: they developed the two primary
traits of individualism and optimism, with which our democracy so
long and so completely harmonized.
The importance of the historical background is no less readily
illustrated by the example of Great Britain. Greatest among the form-
ative elements of British democracy has no doubt been the insular
position of the nation; a position which exempted it from the neces-
sity of maintaining large armies or wasting its substance on constant
war, and gave it the tranquility needed to shelter representative institu-
tions. From the same factor of insular position the British drew, in
the course of centuries, a homogeneity which enabled each man to
trust his neighbor, and so permitted the emergence of the vital civil
liberties—liberty of speech, of the press, and of assemblage. The sea
which environs Britain was another formative factor; for as a free
highway to all lands, all peoples, and all cultures, the sea is a great
teacher of liberty. But obviously the most powerful of the recent ele-
ments in the moulding of British democracy has been the industrial
revolution, and the consequent growth of huge urban populations ex-
posed to all the hazards of a constantly-changing world economy. For
a time this tremendous change simply accentuated the age-old British
reliance upon individual resourcefulness, but in the end it necessitated
protective state interventions. This, if we but study British history
closely enough, will seem entirely natural. It becomes clear that a
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people of forty-seven millions who try, in a country the size of
Illinois and Wisconsin combined, to raise an already high standard of
living, requires an alertly protective government, and that this gov-
ernment has to pay close attention to social welfare.
With Australia and New Zealand the situation seems different. The
American visitor is at first puzzled to find that young nations, still in
the gristle, still hopefully adventurous, still dwelling in lands so empty
that they could at least treble their populations without discomfort,
should take an attitude toward state intervention so different from that
which we long took. Both Dominions have had frontiers. Australia
still has one
—
perhaps the toughest frontier on the globe. Both have
grown by immigration. Both have had their share of laissez faire
indoctrination. Why then are they so alien from the great democratic
traditions expressed by McKinley, Taft, and Mr. Monsanto Quinn? I
have found Americans in Auckland and Brisbane profanely anxious
over that question. They can more quickly find the answer in that
classic summary of New Zealand history, H. Pember Reeves's Aio-Te-
Roa: the Long White Cloud, than in libraries of current economics
and politics.
For the answer is rooted in history. The first settlement of New
Zealand was made in the period of Chartist revolt against economic
and political oppression in Great Britain, and by men determined to
forestall the rise of similar oppressions in the new colony; something
they could do only by firm use of state controls. The first sturdy settle-
ments were made not by individual migration, but by the transplanting
of whole communities to green New Zealand; a sober English com-
munity establishing Canterbury Settlement, to which Samuel Butler
gave fame, and a canny Scottish community establishing Dunedin,
each complete with churches, schools, a library, a college, and even a
museum. Settlement took place, that is, after a fashion which fostered
community sentiment. New Zealand grew, too, by a steady trickle of
immigration which always included workingmen of radical notions; a
streamlet which kept alive the dislike of ancient social wrongs in
Europe, and which maintained a contact with advanced European
thought. Such considerations help explain why, when in the 1880's and
1890's New Zealand farmers and stockmen fell under the same har-
row that was mercilessly goring the life out of American farmers,
they put Richard Seddon into power to launch a great pioneer program
of social legislation: an income tax law, votes for women, loans to
settlers for buying land, loans to workmen for buying homes, state
mining enterprises to break up monopoly, a State Trust office, state
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insurance, and a compulsory arbitration system to make New Zealand
(or so it was hoped) a land without strikes. These factors explain the
basic difference between the outlook of Auckland and of New York
upon the role of government in a democratic state.
For explaining the outlook of Australia there are similar historical
considerations. The first colonization of Australia, for reasons usually
passed over hastily by patriotic citizens of that country, took place
under rigid state controls. When later settlers came they found a land
starker, dryer, and harder than America; a land in which the indi-
vidual was relatively helpless. These migrants brought no tradition of
a weak state. Instead, a strong and energetic government was needed
to aid them. In a country where the paucity of rich, well-watered soil,
heavy forests, and varied minerals made capital hard to accumulate,
state aid was necessary to provide ports, roads, railways, and irrigation
works. Again a steady trickle of English workmen, many in revolt
against European conditions and many well-read in the literature of
revolt, gave a special color to Australian thought. Cities arose that were
disproportionately large in comparison with the total population; and
the workers of Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, and Perth
were determined to use the government to protect Australia against
labor-gluts, wage-cutting, and corporate tyrannies. In Australia a vig-
orous secondary industry is now being planted on the foundations of
the old primary industries ; iron mills, machine shops, and engineering
works are flourishing, and the number of trade union members has
risen to nearly 1,000,000. It is not strange that at the Political Science
Conference at Canberra of January, 1944, all the eminent speakers
agreed that an indefinite continuance of most of the present state con-
trols would be proper; and the Prices Commissioner, Dr. Douglas Cop-
land, who is generally regarded as a conservative economist, declared
himself in favor of the socialization—not the nationalization, but the
socialization—of coal-mining, banking, insurance, shipping, broadcast-
ing, and some other important industries. Nor is it strange, in the light
of Australian history, that at this Canberra gathering of leading politi-
cians, department heads, and political scientists, the centre of the stage
was suddenly stolen by a humble tram-conductor from Sydney who
read an impressive paper on the workers' post-war demands.
We can tolerate and even appreciate external differences in demo-
cratic ways if we comprehend that they are the outgrowth of historic
forces. It was not perversity which made Lloyd George, before the first
World War, carry Britain over to a broad programme of social legis-
lation; he did it in obedience to deep-rooted economic and historic
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compulsions. It was not perversity which made Mr. Savage and Mr.
Peter Fraser, the two successive New Zealand prime ministers since
1935, put into effect perhaps the most far-reaching system of health
insurance and health benefits, and the most comprehensive social
security plan, including family allowances, known anywhere in the
world; together with a state guarantee of wage levels and of farm
prices. That, too, is in harmony with New Zealand's history stretching
back to the days of Wakefield a hundred years ago. Experimentation
is baneful if it is merely capricious, running counter to national tradi-
tion ; but the varieties of national experience can produce very whole-
some variegations in democratic methods and aims. Fifty years after
"King Dick" Seddon took power, it is clear that democracy the world
over has had a good deal to learn from New Zealand's experiments.
For two reasons Americans ought to find most of the external
differences rather easy to accept. One is that America, after long fol-
lowing a path dominated by our great national traits of individualism
and optimism, has now veered to a road which runs more and more
nearly parallel with that of Great Britain and Australasia. Our free
land is long since gone. Like Great Britain, we have become crowded.
Our cities present huge conglomerates of people who have no resource
beyond their weekly pay-envelopes. Our economy has become pre-
cariously dependent on world forces which may create depression and
poverty within a few months. Sixty years ago Lord Bryce, in the last
pages of his American Commonwealth, remarked that the traveller
faring westward from Europe, after voyaging for days under sunny
skies, finally saw before him a dark shadow. It was the dense belt of
fog and cloud lying over the Grand Banks, and the ship soon plunged
into its clammy embrace. Just so, he predicted, the American republic,
which for 250 years had voyaged under sunny skies, would in time
plunge into a zone of cloud. Population would thicken, natural re-
sources would become depleted, cities full of slums and labor troubles
would arise, and we would face the same complex social problems
that Europe had long before confronted. Bryce was right. A change
has come over the conditions of our national life, and with it the neces-
sity for an alteration in our democratic outlook which will bring it
nearer the British attitude. We are still debating just how great this
alteration should be.
The other reason why we need not shrink from the external differ-
ences between our ways and the British ways is that we may be fairly
sure that no British nation will go too far on the road of state social-
ism. One need spend but little time in London, Manchester, and Glas-
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gow; in Auckland and Wellington; in Sydney and Melbourne, to find
how large, how powerful, and how determined a body of fighters is
battling for individual enterprise and free initiative. The typical Briton,
at home or overseas, is not a Socialist. He is a hardfisted, hardheaded
individualist. His trade associations and chambers of commerce ring
with the same slogans heard in similar American organizations. He will
go further to accept state controls than the American businessman; but
he will not go much further.
And we should note, too, that the dominant voices among British
writers on government, reacting against Marxians, Fabians, and totali-
tarians alike, have now for years expounded the doctrine that individual
values must be vigorously maintained. Bertrand Russell is too much an
anarchic individualist, or an individualistic anarchist, to give comfort
to democrats. But Harold Laski, in Authority and the Modern State,
A Grammar of Politics, and other books, denounces the doctrine of
state sovereignty as invalid; asserts that the natural rights of the
individual are a reality ; declares that the freedom of the individual is
best protected by distributing authority among a wide array of institu-
tions, economic, ecclesiastical, political, and social ; and states that the
only valid criterion of the worth of any institution is the contribution
it makes to individual welfare.
A very different thinker, Dr. L. T. Hobhouse, arrives by a different
road at the same conclusion. He asserts, in Elements of Social Justice
and Social Development, that while the individual certainly has per-
sonality, neither the state nor the group possesses any; that the state is
properly to be viewed in a mechanistic, not an organic, light; and that
the functions of the state are to be tested by the common good, in which
the cardinal element is always personal freedom. Not dissimilar, again,
is the conclusion of the conservative Lord Hugh Cecil, in his series
of books beginning with Liberty and Authority. He declares that indi-
vidual conscience is sovereign, that men have personal rights to liberty
and property, and that freedom is essential to the development of
individual character. Finally, the same note is eloquently struck by
Ernest Barker in his recent work Reflections on Government. He
argues that democracy once seemed to be allied with laissez faire,
because the range of persons covered by its view was small ; it had
not struck down to the masses; its outlook embraced only a limited
class of employers and traders. As soon as the democratic state recog-
nized that personal freedom was not the monopoly of a limited section,
but the universal right of all, it moved toward intervention. But, writes
Dr. Barker:
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The democratic state will intervene only . . . for the purpose of ensuring
the maximum of individual liberty. It is true that . . . this purpose per-
mits ... a constant and complicated intervention. To remove all hindrances
to liberty at all points of friction, and to reconcile all the jars of conflicting
liberties, involves action no less permanent and various . . . than any other
object can possibly involve. But from another point of view, the interven-
tion of the democratic state will never be positive and wholehearted. The
foot will always be on the brake, and the presumption will always be
against intervention, even in the act of intervention. The end is always
individual self-help and individual self-determination; the action of the
state, however constant and complicated it may be, is always a means to
that end. The state intervenes to prevent an intervention more dangerous
than its own.
While powerful business groups from Birmingham to Brisbane are
reinforced by these theoretical voices in favor of the ancient British
principle of individual liberty and enterprise, Americans will not find
democracy in Britain or Canada, Australia or New Zealand, drifting
far away from its familiar moorings.
The second requirement of successful democracy, I have said, is
that it must give the nation in which it operates a natural unity. One
of the essential features of democracy, always conspicuous in English-
speaking countries, is the fixed habit of compromise. In any ordinary
political contest, the two sides never proceed to extremes. In a contest
over a bill, the majority does not use its strength with a giant's bru-
tality, but reaches a workable adjustment with the minority; in an
election contest, the victor does not proscribe his enemy, and the van-
quished does not plot a revolution. The tradition of compromise exists
because each group admits that the interests of the whole are greater
than the interest of any part; that is, a common denominator of unity
exists. In true democracies all the elements of national life work in
general harmony. The farmers, workingmen, industrialists, the different
religious sects, the political parties, the associations and clubs, refuse
to carry their conflicts beyond a well-understood point; they never
imperil the stability of the state. But in Italy before Mussolini came
into power, and in Germany before Hitler rose to ascendency, natural
harmony failed. The nation was split into a multitude of warring
fragments; political and economic groups fought each other with
implacable hatred. The Italian and German peoples found themselves
menaced by centrifugal forces that had passed beyond ordinary con-
trols. Inevitably, men arose who declared that national unity could be
restored only by a determined drive from the Left or Right. The drive
came. In these two nations it was from the Right, as in Russia it had
been from the Left. An artificial unity was imposed by force, and all
{66}
vestiges of democracy perished at the hands of a dictatorship. But in
the democracies a natural unforced unity has always prevailed. Let
those who think that such natural unity is not invaluable read Dr.
Adolph Lowe's unforgettable book The Price of Liberty.
In wartime, unity is more urgent, more completely indispensable
than ever. There are two ways to achieve it. One is by pushing to
extremes the methods with which A. Mitchell Palmer and other coer-
cionists experimented in the last war. The other has been given a
superlative illustration by Great Britain in this conflict. That Britain in
1940 was faced with the direst peril in many centuries nobody doubts;
for not only was a seemingly irresistible enemy on her doorstep, but
this enemy was determined to crush out Britain's independent existence
—to reduce her to vassalage, and perhaps destroy her language and
recolonize her. That grim prospect for a time galvanized the nation into
desperate activity. Men toiled in the war industries seventy-seven hours
a week. All property was subjected to conscription. Women were
drafted. Workers in indispensable occupations were frozen to their
jobs. Young and old prepared to die fighting in the streets. Even after
the R.A.F. so immortally broke the impending invasion, a desperate
war effort still had to be maintained. Britain settled down to the long,
nerve-wearing pull ; and how did her Government achieve the requisite
unity for it?
It did this by creating ideal conditions for unity; that is, by going
as far as it could to make sure that all would fare alike, that dangers
and hardships would fall on all equally, and that benefits would be
distributed with absolute justice. To begin with, drastic steps were
taken to equalize income. By midsummer of 1942, the number of
Britons paying income tax had risen by almost four millions. All but a
trifle of the great gain in national income had gone to those whose
incomes were below $2,000 annually; the upper brackets had received
none of it. Meanwhile, taxation had contributed with irresistible power
to the leveling of income. No person in Great Britain can now enjoy
an income, after taxation, of more than $24,000 a year; there were
not eighty people in 1942 who had an income that large; there are
not more than sixty such incomes in the whole kingdom today. In the
second place, the war government of Britain created an almost abso-
lute equality of consumption. Food from the beginning has been strictly
rationed, and the only extra rations permitted have gone to persons
performing specially arduous work, such as coal-mining or farm labor.
All clothing is rationed with equal rigor, and again the only extra al-
lowances go to those who clearly need it; for example, to shipbuilders,
{67}
or people blitzed out of their homes. It is true that people with money
can eat in restaurants; but restaurant meals are held to three courses
at fixed prices, and in practise most of the restaurant-patronage is by
workers. Not only do nearly all Britons fare alike in food and garb, but
even the old inequalities in housing have been reduced. Especially in
the days of heavy air raids, a small country cottage was far more
desirable than a West End mansion; and with the scarcities in fuel and
servants, it remains so. In the third place, the war government in
Britain has greatly expanded the range of social services open to the
poor. These include the publicly-managed eating-places or "British
restaurants" which serve so many millions of meals weekly, and which
prove that communal feeding can be comfortable as well as economical;
the great hostels for war workers, sometimes housing eight or ten
thousand people in a group of comfortable buildings equipped with
every amenity; and the day-nurseries for children of workers, which
at a shilling a day provide youngsters with fresh clothes, three meals,
supervised play, a bath, and medical attention.
When all share alike, men and women are willing to toil without
stint or complaint. The people of a nation are ready to make any num-
ber of sacrifices if only they are certain that all are sacrificing alike.
It is the spectacle of special privilege that creates discontent and dis-
sension. These spectres have not been wholly abolished in Britain.
But by its rigorous attempts to guarantee equality in hardships and
equality in benefits, the Government has gone far toward exorcising
them.
In Australia and New Zealand, the same desire to achieve war
unity has brought about, after the same fashion as in Great Britain,
the imposition of firmer social controls than any known in America.
Not only are food, fuel, and clothing strictly rationed. The investment
of money is restricted, and nobody may put funds into nonessential
enterprises. In all essential occupations (and there are now few others)
no person may leave work or be discharged without government con-
sent. New Zealand has imitated Great Britain by instituting compulsory
registration for certain industries, notably the engineering trades, con-
struction, and timber work; men up to fifty-nine, and women between
twenty and thirty, who are deemed specially fitted for these occupa-
tions, may be forcibly transferred to them. This means (as in Great
Britain) that many a prosperous business or professional man, trained
early in life in a certain industry, has been drafted back to it. Profits
of Australian corporations are limited to four per cent of gross capital.
Manufacture of all dispensable articles in both lands has ceased, and
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the definition of dispensable is strict; for example, wedding-rings may
still be made, but engagement rings may not. Retailers in both countries
have been ordered to merge their stores. Australian dealers are for-
bidden to advertise their wares in such a manner as to make them ap-
pear attractive, and so lead to unnecessary buying. Interstate travel in
Australia is forbidden without a priority order, which is not issued
except for good reason. In both Australia and New Zealand the pre-
cautions against speculation in farm lands and real estate generally
take a simple form ; whenever realty is sold the price must be reviewed
by a panel of impartial local citizens, and no increase over pre-war
levels is approved. In Australia no restaurant or hotel, not even lux-
urious Lennon's in Brisbane or the fine clubs of Sydney and Mel-
bourne, is allowed to charge more than 65 cents for lunch or 80 cents
for dinner. Gasoline for private use, cut to zero in Britain, is reduced
to ten per cent of the old totals in Australia. The Australians boast
that their taxation on large incomes is the highest in the world. They
boast that their pressure to force men into essential industries has
been so stringent that whereas the war factories had only 5,000 hands
when Hitler invaded Poland, today they have well over 600,000.
In short, the wartime controls in Australasia, as in Great Britain, go
far toward insuring that everybody works alike, shares alike, and makes
like sacrifices. No such process, of course, can be fully effective. In
wartime some must suffer far more severely than others, while certain
former inequalities of fortune tend to perpetuate themselves. But the
fact that the Government is earnestly attempting to establish a common
level in social hardships and social benefits fortifies that natural unity
which is essential to democracy. In British countries it is universally
assumed that strict controls must long outlast the war. Capital struc-
ture has suffered so severely that spending and investment will have
to be regulated until they can be restored ; for not only has the upkeep
of industrial plants and public works been neglected, but the plant of
the rural industries as well has suffered heavy depreciation. Yet nobody
need fear that in Australasia, and more than in Britain, the old faith
in free initiative will be fundamentally sapped. The new secondary
industries of Australia have risen to astonishing power, with the largest
single steel-mill in the Empire, shipyards that build destroyers and
heavy freighters, airplane factories that turn out Beaufighters, and
motor plants that construct cars, trucks, and 28-ton tanks. They are
headed by vigorous and aggressive men. And it is a significant fact
that the Australian labor unions are themselves sturdy business organi-
zations, which have a weekly income estimated at $120,000 (^37,500),
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and which obviously believe not in Marxianism but simply in getting
a larger share of the benefits of capitalism.
The third requirement of successful democracy, leadership, calls
for a rather more complex explanation than might appear on the
surface, for in English-speaking countries leadership has a special
meaning. Whether in a land of 1,700,000 people like New Zealand, or
134,000,000 like the United States, the popular mind can not properly
guide itself. If men of vision, courage, and constructive power are not
at hand, democracy may stagger and fall through paralysis of will. It
is impossible for the masses in a democracy to produce detailed plans
and hammer out clear-cut policies; democracy means merely that the
masses have the last word in deciding on plans and policies. Clemenceau
declares in his memoirs that nine out of ten ordinary men are stupid,
selfish, and ungrateful, but that even these men can be "pushed to
supreme heights;" for nearly everyone, he remarks, has "an immortal
flame," and under proper leadership, "in spite of our baser selves, the
spirit will in moments of crisis save us." Boldness and courage on
the part of leaders will create boldness and courage among the masses.
Such leadership will not come from ordinary politicians, who as Mr.
Wendell Willkie says are not makers of policy, but are policy-brokers,
and who hang back until they see which way the popular wind is veer-
ing. It will not come from those ordinary Congressmen whose outlook
Mark Twain so shrewdly defined: "One eye on the constituency, and
the other on the swag." It comes from select groups—but the word to
be emphasized is groups.
It is one of the virtues of healthy democracy that in time of crisis
leadership can usually be supplied with extraordinary speed. Dr.
Nicholas Murray Butler, in a gloomy address at Southampton, Long
Island, on September 4, 1938, demanded:
What has happened to democracy in these later years of its history? Why
is it not producing' the powerful and constructive leadership which it so
abundantly enjoyed in its earlier years? Why are there no longer in our
American official life any names to be mentioned . . . with the great
founders of the republic and the outstanding political leaders of widely
varying types and views who distinguished the first century and a quarter
of our nation's history? Why is England in a similar plight? Where in our
time is the successor to Burke or Fox or Pitt, to Peel or Cobden or Glad-
stone, to Balfour or Asquith?
Nobody would think of asking such a question today. Both Britain and
the United States have produced the "powerful and constructive leader-
ship" for which Dr. Butler asked. Britain, indeed, is happy in a leader
whom future historians will certainly not hesitate to compare with
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Chatham, Pitt, and Gladstone. Mr. Churchill has precisely met Clem-
enceau's crowning requirement of a leader, for he has shown that
power of inspiration which calls forth the immortal flame in a people,
and urges it to supreme heights. Nor is the method by which he has
done this at all mysterious. He has done it partly by his resourceful-
ness, and partly by his eloquence, but above all by his consummate
courage—the courage that rises joyously to every ordeal, every chal-
lenge. The difference between a leader who appeals to the valor and
nobility of his people, and a leader who consults their hesitations and
fears, was well illustrated by an incident which antedated the war by
half a dozen years. Mr. Baldwin, then Prime Minister, made a speech
which pictured the terrors of aerial warfare, and expressed a dolorous
fear that no defense could be found against the bomber. He was
answered by Mr. Churchill in a ringing address which not only called
upon the House to shake itself free from a "certain helplessness and
hopelessness that has been spread about" by Baldwin's utterances, but,
demanding a vigorous programme of airplane building, pointed out
that the true British way was to grasp the nettle defiantly:
Our island is surrounded by the sea (so ran Churchill's trumpet-call). It
always has been, and although the House may not realize it, the sea was in
early times a great disadvantage because an invader could come across
the sea and nobody knew where he would land; very often he did not know
himself. On the Continent the lines of advance are fixed by the mountain
passes, the roads, and the fertile plains and rivers. We were under a great
disadvantage a thousand years ago, and we suffered terribly from it. But
we did not give up; we did not evacuate the island and say that we must
live on the mainland. Not at all. We conquered the sea; we became the
mistress of the sea, and the very element which had given the invader
access to the heart of our country, to our hearths and homes, became its
greatest protection—became indeed the bridge which united to us the most
distant parts of our Empire throughout the world.
Now there is the air. The sea perhaps is no longer complete security
for our island development; it must be the air too. Why should we fear
the air? We have as good technical knowledge as any country. There is no
reason to suppose that we can not make machines as good as any country.
We have—though it may be thought conceited to say so—a particular vein
of talent in air-piloting which is in advance of that possessed by other
countries.
That speech showed the true Churchillian touch. The response to that
challenge was the Spitfire, the R.A.F., and the airplane industry which
saved Britain. But the speech also shows the essence of the best demo-
cratic leadership in crisis. The most successful leadership is that which
appeals to the heroic and noble traits of a people, as Lincoln did, as
Woodrow Wilson did, and as Churchill has done.
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But the tradition of the British, like that of the Canadians, the
Australasians, and the Americans, does not heavily emphasize personal
leadership. It emphasizes instead principles and precedents, which
slowly broaden down; it emphasizes institutions and traditions. The
doctrines of Bergson, Sorel, and Pareto on the role of a succession of
elites in carrying forward the destinies of the state; on the importance
of force in resolving the tension between rival elites; and on the neces-
sity for a strong single leader in manipulating this force—such doc-
trines are repugnant to democracy. In the democratic state it is not the
elite but the masses who hold control, and they have nearly always at
hand a variety of leaders, a panel representing numerous beliefs and
policies. Except briefly in time of crisis, the democracy never concen-
trates as much power in one man as the dictatorship gives to its
fuehrer. Instead, it values a multiplicity of leaders, and some critics
find it faulty in so constantly changing its leadership, even while cross-
ing streams. Of this readiness for change the British Commonwealth
offers pertinent examples. Canada still has the Prime Minister under
whom she entered the war. But Great Britain has not; Australia has
not; New Zealand has not—they have all changed Prime Ministers in
wartime. If change means a certain loss, it may also mean a gain of
fresh ideas and impulses.
The fact is that in this matter of leadership we easily fall victims to
an illusion. At a distance, particularly to ill-informed people fed by
cartoons and headlines, the single leader looks all-important. Ameri-
cans think of Mr. Churchill as invaluable and indispensable. Britons
and Australians think of Mr. Roosevelt in the same way. But in London
and Birmingham a more realistic view of Mr. Churchill, recognizing
limitations and faults, is easily discovered; and in New York and
Chicago Mr. Roosevelt is discussed as a man, not a demigod. The
illusion extends still further. At a distance the tasks of government
take on a simplified aspect, and one-man control seems not impossible.
But those who have had even casual glimpses behind the scenes in
London, Washington, and the lesser capitals know how frightfully
complex the labors of government are, how terribly they tax the brains
and energies of a multitude of able men, and how large is the central
group who work the key levers of the machine. Mr. Churchill's gov-
ernment, we say! But the British government has thirty-one depart-
ments, with thirty-one ministers in control, nine of whom sit in the
War Cabinet. No Briton ever thinks of a one-man government. No
Briton undervalues the work of Anthony Eden, as laborious and con-
scientious as he is astute; of Ernest Bevin, so ruggedly forceful in
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handling labor policies; of Oliver Lyttelton as the resourceful Minister
of Production; of Lord Woolton, so quiet, so tactful, and so efficient
in managing first the food problem and now the reconstruction prob-
lem; of the keen-minded, happy-tempered, rough-mannered Herbert
Morrison as Home Secretary; of that experienced Scottish business-
man Sir Andrew Duncan in the Ministry of Supply; of Sir James Grigg
at the War Office, Albert V. Alexander at the Admiralty, and Archibald
Sinclair at the Air Ministry; of Robert Hudson in the arduous and
thankless labors of Minister of Agriculture.
It is not one man, but a group, which has led Great Britain in this
war. In the same way, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have each
had a group leadership; and we may add the United States to the
category. The superlatively great man, the Washington or Lincoln, Pitt
or Churchill, may be something of an accident. But the healthy democ-
racy can always call forth a capable group of leaders whose capacity
excels that of any similar body in an autocracy. Behind this group, too,
lies the tested institution and the hallowed tradition, which to the
democracy are its greatest treasures.
When victory comes, it will be one of our quietest but deepest
satisfactions that it is a victory of democracy. There was a time, after
Hitler overran Denmark, Norway, the Low Countries, and France,
when it seemed that democracy might have to stand for long decades
in a beleaguered and perilous position. Its position after the war will
not be beleaguered. It will again be powerful, triumphant, and expan-
sive. Let us give thanks that such a ring of virile kindred democracies
has encircled the earth, and is ready to share with us the responsi-
bilities of the future. Let us remember that if these other English-
speaking democracies have ways and institutions which differ from
ours, it is primarily because their history and therefore their outlook
have been different—and that some of the differences represent an
experimentation which we may well study. Let us take note that in the
most vital requirement of democracy, the achievement of a natural,
unforced unity, they have certain lessons to teach us. Let us note also
that their methods of producing and using leadership may offer useful
instruction and example to us, as our methods will to them. In short,
without expecting too much in the way of post-war regeneration, let
us value at their true worth the democratic system and democratic out-
look which, in such varied climes, have shown so steady a capacity for
pushing civilization onward, and which will certainly continue to
show it.
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